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LEAD ARTICLE
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AFTER
ZIGLAR V. ABBASI: THE CASE FOR A
CATEGORICAL APPROACH
MICHAEL L. WELLS*
Qualified immunity protects officers from liability for damages unless they
have violated clearly established rights, on the ground that it would be unfair
and counterproductive to impose liability without notice of wrongdoing. In
recent years, however, the Supreme Court has increasingly applied the doctrine
to cases in which it serves little or no legitimate purpose. In Ziglar v. Abbasi,
the rights were clearly established but the Court held that the officers were
immune due to lack of clarity on other issues in the case. Because cases
like Ziglar undermine the vindication of constitutional rights and the
deterrence of violations, critics of immunity have called for its abolition. This
Article rejects both of these approaches. This Article’s thesis is that the
availability of qualified immunity should depend on an assessment of costs and
benefits, which vary depending on context. A better approach is to retain the
basic doctrine but to identify categories of cases in which immunity should be
denied, and others in which it should be strengthened.
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INTRODUCTION
After the September 11, 2001 attacks, federal officials arrested and
detained over seven hundred undocumented aliens.1 Many detainees
were held for several months before being cleared of involvement in
the attacks.2 They sued the Attorney General and other federal
1. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1852–53 (2017).
2. Id. at 1853 (“Conditions in the Unit were harsh. Pursuant to official Bureau of
Prisons policy, detainees were held in tiny cells for over 23 hours a day . . . . Lights in
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officials over their treatment in detention. These complaints asserted
violations of Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure rights and Fifth
Amendment substantive due process and equal protection claims.
Because no federal statute authorizes lawsuits of this sort, the plaintiffs
sought damages under the implied cause of action theory recognized
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics3 for
certain constitutional violations.4 In Ziglar v. Abbasi,5 a 4–to–2 majority
declined to apply the Bivens doctrine to most of the plaintiffs’ claims.6
Ziglar may become a landmark ruling based on its highly restrictive
approach to judge-made damages remedies for constitutional wrongs.
Although the majority consisted of only four Justices,7 the opinion
seems designed to bury the “implied cause of action” doctrine. Nor
did the outcome in Ziglar come as a surprise. Indeed, the Court’s
ruling was the ninth case in a row that narrowed the scope of
permissible Bivens actions.8 One commentator has suggested that, “for
the sake of judicial candor and litigative efficiency[,] [the Court]
should hold that the Bivens cause of action is limited to the facts of
Bivens” and of two other early post-Bivens cases.9
This Article focuses on a separate aspect of Ziglar: over the longer
term, this case may attract as much interest for its holding on a separate
issue—namely, the qualified immunity of executive officials. This
defense blocks the recovery of damages even when the plaintiff can get
past the “cause of action” hurdle by establishing an actionable violation

the cells were left on 24 hours. Detainees had little opportunity for exercise or
recreation. They were forbidden to keep anything in their cells, even basic hygiene
products such as soap or a toothbrush. When removed from the cells for any reason,
they were shackled and escorted by four guards. They were denied access to most
forms of communication with the outside world. And they were strip searched often—
any time they were moved, as well as at random in their cells.”).
3. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
4. See id. at 392 (acknowledging that persons may bring certain constitutional
claims and seek necessary relief even though remedies are not explicitly prescribed
within the Bill of Rights, nor authorized by any statute).
5. 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017).
6. See id. at 1854–65 (denying the plaintiffs’ Bivens claims but remanding for
reconsideration of the plaintiffs’ claim that the warden of the detention facility had
violated the Fifth Amendment by allowing prison guards to abuse them).
7. Justice Gorsuch had not yet been confirmed when the case was argued, and
Justices Kagan and Sotomayor recused themselves. Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion
for the Court. Justices Breyer and Ginsburg dissented.
8. The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Leading Cases, 131 HARV. L. REV. 223, 313 (2017).
9. Id.

382

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:379

of constitutional rights.10 Qualified immunity shields an official
engaged in executive or administrative functions from having to pay
damages for constitutional wrongdoing unless the plaintiff can show
that the official has violated “clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”11
The Court has left no doubt that qualified immunity is a powerful
defense, which “protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.’”12 It not only knocks out many Bivens claims,
but, also, as a practical matter, its greatest impact is in the much larger
number of suits, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,13 against state and
local officials.14
The qualified immunity issue arose in Ziglar because the detainees
did not rely solely on Bivens. They also sued under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3),15 which imposes statutory liability when two or more
persons “conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving . . . any person or
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws.”16 The Civil Rights
Act of 1871 included § 1985(3), which is similar to the better known
and far more widely used § 1983.17 Unlike § 1983, this statute does not
operate only when the defendant has acted “under color of state law”;
it can be used to sue both federal officials and private actors.18 The
§ 1985(3) count of the plaintiffs’ complaint asserted that federal
10. The “cause of action hurdle” refers to whether a particular plaintiff is an
appropriate member of a class of litigants who may invoke the power of the court to
seek a remedy.
11. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Officers engaged in legislative,
judicial, or prosecutorial functions are absolutely immune from paying damages, no
matter how flagrant the violation. See infra note 25.
12. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1867 (2017) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475
U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (authorizing the possibility of civil actions for any
person who is deprived of their constitutional rights).
14. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 n.30 (indicating that the qualified immunity rule
applies to § 1983 litigation).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (allowing any person deprived of their constitutional
rights and privileges by two or more people to bring an action to recover damages).
16. Id.; Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1865–66.
17. Civil Rights Act of 1871, Pub. L. No. 42-22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). Thus, section 1
of the 1871 statute is currently codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and section 2 is currently
codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
18. See, e.g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 99 (1971) (holding that
defendants do not have to just act under color of state law, as conspiracy claims may
be brought under § 1983 against state and federal officials). For examples of § 1983
cases, see Soo Park v. Thompson, 851 F.3d 910, 928 (9th Cir. 2017); and White v.
McKinley, 519 F.3d 806, 816 (8th Cir. 2008).
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officers “detained them in harsh conditions because of their actual or
apparent race, religion, or national origin, in violation of the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment.”19 Absent a compelling
state interest, it is clear that the government may not discriminate on
these grounds.20 Thus, the complaint alleged violations of clearly
established law. Even so, the Court held that the officials were protected
by qualified immunity, reasoning that the § 1985(3) doctrine was
unclear as to whether an actionable conspiracy can exist among officials
of the same department of government and that the case involved high
level executive decision making about national security.
Ziglar is an especially officer-protective qualified immunity decision
because it seems to treat qualified immunity as a general no-liability
rule whenever the law bearing on liability is unsettled and no matter why
liability is uncertain. The holding thus implicitly rejects an alternative
view, under which the official avoids liability only when the disputed
element of the plaintiffs’ claims involves the defensibility of the official’s
conduct. In other words, the Court in Ziglar treats qualified immunity
as a general rule of “no liability when any element is uncertain,” even
when the policies that gave rise to the immunity defense do not apply
in the case at hand. The Court’s approach rests on a preference for
laying down bright-line rules, as opposed to formulating a more refined
doctrine rooted in the reasons that underlie the qualified immunity
defense. This preference for rules is not inherently objectionable,
because rules can serve worthy goals independent of the substantive
interests they are designed to further. These goals include promoting
stability in the law, predictability of outcomes, control of lower level
decision makers, and efficiency in resolving disputes.21 The Court’s
predilection for bright-line rules over substance-driven rules, so vividly
illustrated by Ziglar, permeates the Court’s qualified immunity
doctrine.22 This Article focuses on the institutional interests served by

19. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1853.
20. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 678, 681–
82, 1564–65 (19th ed. 2016) (summarizing the Court’s jurisprudence and application
of classifications that meet strict scrutiny).
21. See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 539–44 (1988) (discussing
the values served by rule-based decision making and concluding that “[f]ormalism . . .
achieves its value when it is thought desirable to narrow the decisional opportunities
and the decisional range of a certain class of decisionmakers”).
22. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV.
207, 258 (2013) [hereinafter Jeffries, Liability Rule] (“Qualified immunity should be
narrowed to adhere more closely to the rationales for limiting liability in the first place.”).
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framing qualified immunity doctrine in the form of rules. It argues that
“ruleness” values deserve to play a role in the qualified immunity
context, but not nearly as much of a role as the Court now accords them.
The universe of constitutional tort cases is not monolithic. One can
make categorical distinctions between substantive contexts in which the
policies favoring immunity are comparatively strong or weak.
This Article’s argument rests on three key points: First, recognizing
the existence of any immunity defense is arguable. Second, there are
nonetheless defensible, substantive justifications for retaining some
form of immunity defense. Third, the best accommodation of the
competing considerations involves marking off manageable categories
of cases in which these substantive grounds for applying the immunity
doctrine are especially weak or strong. As Richard Fallon has
explained, “official immunity doctrines perform an equilibrating
function by diminishing the social costs that constitutional rights
would have if officers who violated them were always strictly liable in
suits for damages.”23 Thus, the case against the Court’s broad rule is
not strong enough to warrant wholesale abandonment of the defense,
despite the empirical arguments marshalled by the Court’s antiimmunity critics. The Court, in addressing the arguments of antiimmunity critics, should embrace a readily available and modest
alternative to the current law that falls short of wholesale abandonment
of the immunity doctrine.
The analysis in this Article honors the Court’s overarching
framework for resolving immunity issues. That framework treats
§ 1983 and § 1985(3) as “common law statutes,” which authorize the
Court to act freely in the manner of a common law court in shaping of
official immunity doctrine.24 The Court “seeks a proper balance
between two competing interests.”25 One set of interests involves
23. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking the Right Questions About Officer Immunity, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 485 (2011).
24. See Hillel Y. Levin & Michael L. Wells, Qualified Immunity and Statutory
Interpretation: A Response to William Baude, CAL. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 2 (forthcoming 2018).
But see William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CAL. L. REV. 45, 50–51
(2018) (arguing that § 1983 is better understood as a “common law statute”); see also
Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1871 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (endorsing Baude’s view).
25. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1866; see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)
(“Qualified immunity balances two important interests . . . .”); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S.
158, 167 (1992) (“Qualified immunity strikes a balance between compensating those
who have been injured by official conduct and protecting government’s ability to
perform its traditional functions.”); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984)
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vindicating constitutional rights and deterring constitutional violations.
On the other side of the ledger lies an interest in ensuring fairness to
government officials26 and in lowering the “social costs” that
constitutional tort litigation can generate.27 The Court’s cost-benefit
model rejects both the notion that a remedy should be available for every
violation of a constitutional right,28 and the proposition that executive
officers should always enjoy immunity from suits for damages.29
A key feature of the doctrine is that the Court refuses to balance
interests on a case-by-case basis—for example, by evaluating in each case
the precise degree of official wrongfulness, the nature and importance
of the constitutional rights at stake, and other considerations presented
by that particular case. Instead, the Court aims for “the best attainable
accommodation of competing values,”30 by applying the “clearly
established law” rule to all qualified immunity cases.31 That rule thus
“reflects a balance that has been struck across the board.”32
This Article does not take issue with the Court’s rejection of case-bycase balancing in the qualified immunity context, particularly because

(discussing the Court’s effort to strike a “balance . . . between the interests in
vindication of citizens’ constitutional rights and in public officials’ effective
performance of their duties”); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813–14 (1982) (“The
resolution of immunity questions inherently requires a balance between the evils
inevitable in any available alternative.”).
26. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978) (“[I]t is not unfair to hold
liable the official who knows or should know he is acting outside the law.”); Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975) (“Liability for damages for every action which is
found subsequently to have been violative of a student’s constitutional rights . . . would
unfairly impose upon the school decisionmaker the burden of mistakes made in good
faith in the course of exercising his discretion . . . .”); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
240 (1974) (holding that one rationale for official immunity is “the injustice,
particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability an officer who is
required, by the legal obligations of his position, to exercise discretion”); Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967) (“A policeman’s lot is not so unhappy that he must
choose between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he
has probable cause, and being mulcted in damages if he does.”).
27. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1866 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)).
28. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1779–86 (1991) (arguing American
legal tradition demonstrates that there are constitutional rights without individually
effective remedies).
29. For a defense of absolute immunity for executive officers in the common law
context, see Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
30. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
31. See supra note 11.
32. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 642 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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a repudiation of case-by-case balancing marks much of our
constitutional law. In the First Amendment context, for example, the
Court has generally rejected such balancing, because it would “lead to
unpredictable results and uncertain expectations.”33 To say that the
Court has wisely embraced a non-case-by-case balancing approach in
qualified immunity cases is not to say, however, that the particular
approach it has embraced makes good sense. Close examination
suggests that the Court’s current approach gives too much weight to
the pro-immunity side of the balancing ledger. Cost-benefit balancing
is best employed, as it is in First Amendment doctrine, as a means for
making rough, but useful, comparisons among categories of fact
patterns.34 A category-by-category approach would accommodate the
competing policies at work in qualified immunity cases more fully than
the Court’s current across-the-board rule. And it would do so without
giving up the benefits of rule-based doctrine.
Part I of this Article focuses on Ziglar and makes two points, one in
Section I.A and the other in Section I.B. Section I.A shows that the
application of qualified immunity in Ziglar does not square with the
aims of the doctrine, but only with the values served by bright-line
rules. The Court’s premise, albeit unarticulated and unexamined, is
that qualified immunity must operate as a sweeping rule that is equally
applicable in each and every case. Section I.B argues that the case for
a rule of this kind is unpersuasive, because its costs outweigh its
benefits. Part II addresses critics of qualified immunity who favor its
abolition by one means or another, in favor of a general rule of liability
for constitutional torts.35 Section II.A defends qualified immunity
against objections that it rests on faulty empirical premises and Section
II.B rejects an alternative approach that would greatly expand
recoveries by shifting liability to local governments. This Article’s
defense of qualified immunity, however, is not a defense of the current

33. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343–44 (1974) (rejecting case-bycase balancing in setting free speech constraints on liability for defamation).
34. Cf. SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 20, at 944–46.
35. See, e.g., Lynn Adelman, The Erosion of Civil Rights and What to Do About It, 2018
WIS. L. REV. 1, 7 (2018); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 757, 811–13 (1994) (focusing on Fourth Amendment remedies); Karen M.
Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: The Maze, the Mud, and the Madness, 23 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 913, 925 (2015); Mark R. Brown, The Failure of Fault Under § 1983: Municipal
Liability for State Law Enforcement, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1503, 1510–11 (1999); Joanna C.
Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797, 1799–1800
(2018) [hereinafter Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity].
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regime. Building on this idea, Part III proposes a new approach that
gives significant—but not always controlling—weight to the values of
rule-based doctrine. The alternative this Article calls for is judicial
recognition of a limited number of categories in which the defense is
unavailable because the benefits of immunity are significantly
outweighed by its costs. Section III.A identifies six such categories.
Section III.B then identifies two categories of cases in which the
benefits of immunity are especially high in comparison to its costs. In
these two sets of cases, according to the analysis offered here, a
thoughtful build-out of categorical balancing rules might well support
the displacement of the Court’s existing clear-error approach with a
truly bright-line rule of absolute immunity.
I. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY IN ZIGLAR
Official immunity protects all officials engaged in “discretionary”
functions from liability for damages, at least to some extent. Judges,36
legislators,37 and prosecutors38—or, more precisely, persons engaged
in judicial, legislative, and prosecutorial functions39—are absolutely
immune from liability for damages, no matter how egregious their
conduct is. Executive and administrative acts are covered by qualified
immunity. Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald,40 officers who engage in these
acts are “are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”41 Thus,
plaintiffs may lose even when they can prove a violation of
constitutional rights and damages resulting from the violation.
A.

Ziglar and the Policies Underlying Qualified Immunity

In Ziglar, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion ordered dismissal of
the § 1985(3) claim on the ground that all of the officer-defendants
were shielded from liability under the qualified immunity doctrine.
According to the opinion, the application of § 1985(3) to these
allegations failed the “clearly established law” test, because “the
36. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978).
37. Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 52–54 (1998).
38. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976).
39. See, e.g., Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991) (distinguishing between the
advocative and investigative conduct of prosecutors); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219
(1988) (distinguishing judicial from administrative functions).
40. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
41. Id. at 818.
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conspiracy recited in the complaint was alleged to have been between
or among officers in the same branch of the government (the
Executive Branch) and in the same department (the Department of
Justice).”42 Without addressing whether such “intrabranch” behavior
can give rise to a conspiracy for purposes of § 1985(3), the Court held
that the law on the question lacked sufficient clarity.43 In order to show
why, Justice Kennedy drew an analogy to the antitrust context.44 In
antitrust, the Court rejected the existence of “intracorporate
conspiracies” to restrain trade because the officers of a corporation all
act for the same corporate entity.45 As such, “agents of the same legal
entity are not distinct enough to conspire with one another.”46 As for
§ 1985(3), the Court had never ruled one way or the other on the
“intracorporate conspiracy doctrine.”
Turning to lower court
decisions, Justice Kennedy found a division of authority over the
viability of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, in cases that
involved suits against private businesses and officers sued for violations
under § 1985(3).47 This division of lower court authority was
apparently decisive: “When the courts are divided on an issue so
central to the cause of action alleged, a reasonable official lacks the
notice required before imposing liability.”48 Thus, the officials avoided
liability because “[u]nder these principles, . . . reasonable officials in
petitioners’ positions would not have known, and could not have
predicted, that § 1985(3) prohibited their joint consultations and the
resulting policies that caused the injuries alleged.”49
Ziglar is an ambitious qualified immunity case in part because the
Court ruled on a motion to dismiss the complaint, and thus

42. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1867 (2017).
43. See id. (holding that here reasonable officers could not have known the law
applied to their behavior).
44. Id. (comparing officers of a corporate entity jointly adopting a policy with
federal agents of the same department making a similar joint agreement).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1868.
47. See id. (finding that since § 1985(3) does not contain an “under color of” state
law requirement, it can be used against private actors for violations of civil rights and
against officials acting under color of federal law).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1867. The Court also said that immunity was justified because “open
discussion among federal officers is to be encouraged, so that they can reach consensus
on the policies a department of the Federal Government should pursue.” Id. at 1868.
For a discussion of this aspect of the opinion, see infra Section III.B.
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“accept[ed] as true the facts alleged in the complaint,”50 including the
allegation that the officers unjustifiably discriminated against the
plaintiffs on the basis of race, religion, and national origin. The
impermissibility of such discrimination has been settled for decades,
and the Court in Ziglar does not suggest otherwise. The only lack of
clarity in the case involved the intrabranch conspiracy issue. The
question thus arises whether this type of lack of clarity should matter.
1. Fairness to defendants
An important objection to the Court’s reliance on “uncertainty as to
intracorporate conspiracies” is that the uncertainty on that point has
nothing to do with the either of the two rationales for qualified
immunity. First, official immunity is recognized as a matter of fairness
when an officer reasonably believes he is acting within the
constitutional rules.51 For example, in Pierson v. Ray,52 the first modern
case in the development of qualified immunity for constitutional torts,
the Court awarded qualified immunity to police officers to avoid the
unfairness of imposing liability without fault.53 Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Warren emphasized the unfairness of a strict liability rule
when he wrote: “A policeman’s lot is not so unhappy that he must
choose between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not
arrest when he has probable cause, and being mulcted in damages if
he does.”54 Thus, the Court recognized a defense of “good faith and
probable cause,” which meant that the officer would have a defense if
he reasonably believed the arrest was proper, even if the arrest in fact
violated the Fourth Amendment. In Scheuer v. Rhodes,55 the Court
added that recognizing qualified immunity avoids “the injustice,
particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability an
officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his position, to
exercise discretion.”56 More recently, in Hope v. Pelzer,57 the Court said

50. Id. at 1852.
51. See id. at 1867 (discussing the inherent tension between private citizens’
constitutional rights and police officers’ ability to perform their duties effectively).
52. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
53. Id. at 557.
54. Id. at 555.
55. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
56. Id. at 240.
57. 536 U.S. 730 (2002).

390

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:379

that the point of qualified immunity is that officials are entitled to “fair
warning” that their act violates federal law.58
This fairness rationale is analogous to the negligence rule in
ordinary tort law. A central principle of negligence law is that it is
unfair to impose liability on a private actor who cannot reasonably
foresee that his act will injure someone.59 It seems similarly unfair to
impose liability on an officer who cannot reasonably foresee that his
act will violate a plaintiff’s constitutional rights. There is a difference
between private actors and state officials, in sense that officials typically
do intend to touch, threaten, imprison, or otherwise invade the
plaintiff’s person or property. But this difference is irrelevant to the
“fair warning” issue. Fair warning relates to whether the officer made
a choice to risk unconstitutional interference with the plaintiff.60 Some
intentional interferences are unconstitutional and others are not.61
Officers who reasonably but mistakenly believe they have sufficient
grounds to make an arrest, fire an employee, or revoke a business
license lack “fair warning” that they have crossed constitutional lines.62
This principle is reflected in the common law of intentional torts,
which declines to impose liability on a person who shoots another,
even a police officer, in the absence of fair warning that his target is

58. Id. at 739–40; see also Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975) (finding
liability for all constitutional violations, no matter how innocent, “would unfairly
impose upon the school decision maker the burden of mistakes made in good faith in
the course of . . . his official duties”).
59. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 77 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
1963) (“The requirement of an act is the requirement that the defendant should have
made a choice. But the only possible purpose of introducing this moral element is to
make the power of avoiding the evil complained of a condition of liability. There is
no such power where the evil cannot be foreseen.”). Holmes’ rationale remains “the
most influential theoretical argument on behalf of a negligence rule tied to the
principle of reasonable foresight.” RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 121 (11th ed. 2016). Modern tort theorists have elaborated
on this central principle. See, e.g., Stephen Perry, Torts, Rights, and Risk, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 60, 60 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014)
(“[T]he fundamental moral right underlying negligence law is, roughly, a right not to
be caused reasonably foreseeable physical harm as a proximate result of another
person’s engaging in unreasonably risky conduct towards one.”); ARTHUR RIPSTEIN,
PRIVATE WRONGS 89–94 (2016) (discussing the role of foresight in negligence law).
60. See, e.g., Hope, 536 U.S. at 739–41 (noting that officers are on notice that their
conduct is unlawful only so far as their conduct violates “clearly established” law).
61. Id.
62. Id.
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not an aggressor.63 It is equally unfair to impose constitutional tort
liability on an officer in a similar situation.
2. “Social costs”
Second, constitutional tort litigation generates “social costs [which]
include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from
pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from
acceptance of public office.”64 All litigation produces similar costs, yet
no immunity defense is generally available to private persons and
entities. The difference between private and public actors is that
public actors face a different incentive structure. The core of the
“social costs” rationale for official immunity is that, at least in theory,
private actors capture the benefits of their actions.65 When those
actions generate risks to others, private actors should take those costs
into account.66 The aim is to encourage them to (more or less
accurately) weigh the real costs against the benefits. Public officers do
not capture the benefits of their actions in the same way. Those
benefits go to society at large, for example, in the form of effective
policing, fire protection, safe products, clean air and water, good
teaching, and generally efficient administration of government.67
Allowing for official immunity maximizes social utility and, by
extension, social welfare by enabling officials to act without limitation
toward the public good.68 If officers were liable for every constitutional
violation, they might hesitate before taking a step that produces a
public benefit because an error would lead to personal liability. A
police officer may decline to make an arrest that arguably violates the
Fourth Amendment, or the supervisor of a government agency may
decline to fire an incompetent employee whose job is arguably
protected under the due process clause. From the “social costs”
63. See Courvoisier v. Raymond, 47 P. 284, 286–87 (Colo. 1896) (finding that if the
defendant’s fears were reasonable under the circumstances then liability would not be
extended).
64. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
65. See, e.g., Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 412 (1997) (discussing the
incentive structures that private firms face and how it affects behavior).
66. Reasoning along similar lines, the Court rejected qualified immunity for
privately employed prison guards in Richardson. Id. at 409.
67. For a systematic exposition of this point, see Ronald A. Cass, Damage Suits
Against Public Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1110, 1135–40 (1981).
68. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 (1988) (explaining that “the threat of
liability can create perverse incentives that operate to inhibit officials in the proper
performance of their duties”).
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perspective, the rationale for the defense is that official immunity will
correct the asymmetrical incentives officials otherwise face.69 The
availability of a defense protects officers who act in the public interest.
Thus, the defense encourages the police officer to make the arrest and
the supervisor to fire the employee despite the uncertain constitutional
issue that would otherwise counsel caution.
3. Fairness, utility, and the conspiracy issue
In Ziglar, neither fairness nor utility were threatened by the
imposition of liability. According to the complaint, the officials
deliberately discriminated on the basis of race, religion, and national
origin in their abusive treatment of the detainees.70 There is no lack
of clarity in the constitutional doctrine that forbids these types of
discrimination, no lack of fair warning that the acts are forbidden, and
no danger that officials will be overly cautious in an area in which the
constitutional line is uncertain. The application of § 1985(3)
conspiracy doctrine is a collateral matter. Lack of clarity on that issue
is as irrelevant as lack of clarity on the statute of limitations, or issue
preclusion. It is as though the Court, instead of permitting an action
for a clear constitutional violation in Bivens itself, should have held that
the officials were immune because of lack of clarity as to the previous
available Bivens actions. Many questions may determine outcomes, but
not all of them have to do with the state of the law as to whether the
conduct at issue violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. If the
officers knew they could be sued under § 1985(3) pursuant to an
“intrabranch conspiracy” theory, they understood (according to the
complaint) that they were violating constitutional rights.71
In this respect, the Ziglar Court seems to enlarge the scope of
qualified immunity beyond the Harlow doctrine.72 Harlow held that
executive officials are immune from damages “insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.”73 The plaintiffs in
Ziglar claimed violations of their rights to equal protection and
religious liberty. These rights were “clearly established,” no matter how
69. See Cass, supra note 67, at 1152 (describing the pressures public officials face
and the social benefits of damage liability).
70. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1853 (2017).
71. Id. at 1853–54.
72. Id. at 1872 (acknowledging the Court’s precedent and the gradual expansion
of qualified immunity).
73. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (emphasis added).
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unclear the doctrine may have been on whether intragovernmental
conspiracy can trigger § 1985(3) liability.74 Under Ziglar, it appears that
the defendant may win without showing lack of clarity as to the right
violated, so long as he can show that the law is uncertain as to other
aspects of the plaintiff’s case.
B. Benefits and Costs of the Ziglar Rule
In Ziglar, the Court treats “lack of clearly established law” as a broad
rule, which hinges on lack of clarity across-the-board, not only as to the
core legal obligation owed by the defendant, but also as to whether
§ 1985(3) reaches collaboration among members of the same Executive
Department.75 The rule controls the outcome even though there is no
link between the rationales for the rule and its application to the
plaintiff’s substantive claims. Ziglar presents a typical example of the
Supreme Court’s increasing focus on developing sharp edge rules in its
qualified immunity cases. The early cases on qualified immunity
considered several factors in their application of the defense, including
the nature of the defendant’s duties and his state of mind.76
Beginning with Harlow, the Court moved to a more rule-oriented
approach, by taking two steps.77 First, it abandoned the old distinctions
among government jobs in favor of a general norm for all qualified

74. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1869.
75. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION
OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 23 (1991) (explaining that
“generalization, with its necessary selection and suppression, is . . . central to
prescribing by rule”).
76. Pierson v. Ray focused on the special problems confronted by police officers.
386 U.S. 547 (1967). In Scheuer v. Rhodes, the defendant was the governor of Ohio, and
the Court framed the issue with that office in mind. 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974)
(explaining that because “the options which a chief executive and his principal
subordinates must consider are far broader and far more subtle than those made by
officials with less responsibility,” the governor was entitled to a “comparably broad”
“range of discretion”). Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), took the same approach
with school administrators. In Pierson, Scheuer, and Wood, the Court developed a twoprong test. In the school administrator context, for example:
The official himself must be acting sincerely and with a belief that he is doing
right, but an act violating a student’s constitutional rights can be no more
justified by ignorance or disregard of settled, indisputable law on the part of
one entrusted with supervision of students’ daily lives than by the presence of
actual malice.
Wood, 420 U.S. at 321.
77. 457 U.S. 800, 816–18 (1982).
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immunity cases.78 Second, it eliminated the subjective “malice” or
“good faith” prong in favor of what it characterized as an “objective”
test.79 Some of the reasoning of Harlow seemed, at least to Justice
Brennan, to permit recovery when the official “actually knows that he
was violating the law . . . even if he could not ‘reasonably have been
expected’ to know what he actually did know.”80 The Court blocked
even that avenue a few years later in Anderson v. Creighton,81 holding in
the context of a Fourth Amendment challenge to a search that the test
is strictly objective.82 The officer’s “subjective beliefs about the search
are irrelevant.”83 The Court further extended the rule in Ashcroft v. AlKidd,84 at least in its rhetoric, by stating that it would apply unless
“every” officer would have been on notice that his action was
unconstitutional, and by adding that the constitutional validity of the
officer’s action must have been “beyond debate” at that time.85 But
Ziglar goes further than any of these cases. The innovation in Ziglar is
to apply qualified immunity to lack of clarity not only on the content
of “constitutional rights,” on which Harlow had focused, but on a
collateral matter as to the applicability of a particular statute.
1. Form and substance in qualified immunity doctrine
It is easy to criticize practically any rule, because there is always a gap
between the fact patterns to which the rule applies and the policies on
which the rule is based. As a result, the rule is overinclusive,
underinclusive, or both.86 For example, because the Court’s rule for
qualified immunity in Ziglar is triggered by “lack of clarity” in judicial
78. Id. at 817–18 (indicating that the reformulated rule would apply to
government officials in general); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 642 n.4,
642–43 (1987).
79. 457 U.S. at 816–18.
80. Id. at 821 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S.
555, 565 (1978)).
81. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
82. Id. at 641.
83. Id.
84. 563 U.S. 731 (2011).
85. Id. at 741. The phrase “beyond debate” seems to have become part of the
standard recitation of the doctrine on qualified immunity. See Kisela v. Hughes, No.
17-467, slip op. at 4 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2018) (per curiam); White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548,
551 (2017) (per curiam).
86. See Schauer, supra note 21, at 539 (“Once we understand that rules get in the
way, that they gain their ruleness by cutting off access to factors that might lead to the
best resolution in a particular case, we see that rules function as impediments to
optimally sensitive decision making.”).
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interpretation of the conspiracy statute, and not based on fairness and
utility rationales, Ziglar sacrifices the plaintiff’s constitutional tort
interest in recovery for a violation of settled constitutional rights. The
ill-fit of the grounds for a rule and the operation of the rule is a
defining feature of rules.87 Otherwise, the “rule” would be superfluous.
A decision maker would reach the same result by applying the policies
underlying the rule. Yet rules are often justified, despite their
clumsiness and seeming arbitrariness, because they serve critical values
of the legal system. Across many areas of law rules contribute to the
resolution of disputes by saving time and effort in decision making,88
generating and maintaining stability in the law,89 enabling us to predict
of outcomes of disputes that may arise,90 and controlling the discretion
of officers who apply the law to particular cases.91
Thus, to evaluate the Ziglar rule fairly, the question of its merit
should be framed differently, as a balance between costs and benefits.
While the rule may be arbitrary, it has many benefits such as
predictability, stability, assuring fairness to officials, and easing
concerns about overdeterrence of effective government operations.
Given the benefits of rules, what substantive interests on the plaintiff’s
side of the case are sacrificed under the Ziglar rule? That is, what are
its costs? Notably in Harlow and many other cases, the Court identifies
the plaintiff’s interest as “vindication” of rights and “deterrence” of
constitutional violations.92 Can those costs be diminished by an
approach that is less sweeping than that of Ziglar, without unduly
sacrificing the fairness and social utility benefits that ruling provides?
The resolution of this question necessarily depends on value choices.
Neither the rigorous champion of remedying constitutional violations
nor the hardcore advocate of effective government will have difficulty
answering them, though in opposite directions. Many judges,
however, will find that their initial value judgments fall somewhere
between the two extremes. On the premise that there is value on both

87.
88.
89.
90.

See SCHAUER, supra note 75, at 224–28.
See id. at 145–49.
See Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 569 (Cal. 1968) (Burke, J., dissenting).
See RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION: TOWARD A THEORY OF
LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 60–62 (1961) (discussing the value or predictability in connection
with reliance on precedent).
91. See SCHAUER, supra note 75, at 158–62.
92. 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982); see also Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386,
395–96 (1987); Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 599–600 (1978); Carey v. Piphus,
435 U.S. 247, 255–56 (1978).
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sides, the task is to draw distinctions between contexts in which the
case for immunity is stronger or weaker.
There is no room for argument that a broad immunity rule like that
of Ziglar will entirely block vindication of constitutional rights and
deterrence of violations in some contexts. When the constitutional
violation is in the past, damages constitute the only viable remedy.
Courts will deny a request for an injunction or declaratory judgment
unless a plaintiff can show a likelihood of recurrence;93 City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons94 illustrates this theme. In Lyons, the police put the
plaintiff in a chokehold.95 He sued for both damages and an injunction,
on the theory that the officer used excessive force.96 The Court held
that the suit for an injunction could not go forward, because Lyons
could not show that he was likely to be choked again.97 Yet there was no
assurance that the police would not continue to use chokeholds.98 A
combination of a broad immunity-from-damages doctrine and this
unavailability of prospective relief could eliminate any action that seeks
to vindicate constitutional rights and deter constitutional violations.
The problem exists across a range of constitutional tort issues, so
long as a plaintiff’s disagreeable encounter with the government is
unlikely to be repeated. Many constitutional tort suits involve random
encounters with the police,99 or complaints by inmates of their
treatment by guards on a specific occasion,100 or one-time decisions by
high-level officers to fire or otherwise disadvantage government
employees under their supervision.101 Typically, the Lyons requirement
93. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983) (emphasizing that
unless a plaintiff is “realistically threatened by a repetition of his experience,” he
cannot seek injunctive relief in federal court).
94. Id. at 107 n.7, 107–09; see, e.g., Updike v. Multnomah Cty., 870 F.3d 939, 947
(9th Cir. 2017).
95. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 97–98.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 105–06; id. at 111 (“Absent a sufficient likelihood that he will again be
wronged in a similar way, Lyons is no more entitled to an injunction than any other citizen
of Los Angeles; and a federal court may not entertain a claim by any or all citizens who no
more than assert that certain practices of law enforcement officers are unconstitutional.”).
98. Id. at 106 (finding that so long as the city did not condone the behavior, Lyons
could not seek injunctive relief at the prospect that a rogue officer could use
chokeholds in defiance of “city policy”).
99. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227–28 (2009); Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641–42 (1987).
100. See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1853 (2017); Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel,
256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001).
101. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Beerman, 94 F.3d 823, 825–26 (2d Cir. 1996).
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of likelihood of recurrence is not present, and for these plaintiffs, “it
is damages or nothing.”102 For this basic reason, alternatives to the
Ziglar rule deserve careful attention.
One simple way to give more weight to vindication and deterrence,
at little cost to the fairness and social utility goals served by official
immunity, would be for the Court to repudiate Ziglar’s focus on
unclear “law” and return to the Harlow formulation, under which
immunity is available only for lack of clarity as to the “rights” the
defendants have violated. The Ziglar opinion gives no indication that
the Court focused on this possibility or even noticed that it was
expanding immunity far beyond Harlow.103 Nor is the Court’s subtle
expansion of immunity addressed by Justice Breyer’s dissent.104 At the
very least, the Court should have to explicitly address the issue of
whether immunity extends to cases like Ziglar, in which the lack of
clarity has nothing to do with the plaintiff’s substantive rights.
Another step would be to eliminate small but tactically important
glosses on the Harlow formulation. For example, the Court has said
that immunity would be available unless clearly established law places
the “statutory or constitutional question beyond debate,”105 and that
immunity is available unless “every” reasonable officer would
understand that the act was unconstitutional.106 This sort of rhetoric
seems to disappear when courts move to deny immunity.107
2. “Featureless generality” as an alternative to Ziglar
The overinclusiveness objection to the qualified immunity rule is not
limited to the Ziglar version of the defense. John Jeffries argues that
the misalignment between the qualified immunity policies and the
Harlow “clearly established law” rule should be remedied by
reformulating the rule, so that it will “adhere more closely to the
102. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
103. 137 S. Ct. at 1851–69 (declining to acknowledge the possibility that defeating
qualified immunity requires even more than for government officials to have violated
rights a reasonable person would have been aware of).
104. Id. at 1872–85 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (failing to address the expansion of
qualified immunity in the majority opinion).
105. Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).
106. Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012). See Karen Blum et al., Qualified
Immunity Developments: Not Much Hope Left for Plaintiffs, 29 TOURO L. REV. 633, 654–55
(2013) (discussing the impact of this language on the adjudication of qualified
immunity issues).
107. See, e.g., Thompson v. Virginia, 878 F.3d 89, 98 (4th Cir. 2017).
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rationales for limiting liability in the first place.”108 To this end, he
rejects the Court’s “hyper-technical” rule, in favor of “a broader
concept of notice derived from existing law.”109 He would “shift the
doctrinal focus from whether the defendant violated a ‘clearly
established’ right to whether the defendant’s actions were ‘clearly
unconstitutional.’”110 What he means by this distinction is that the
Court should take a holistic approach to the situation presented rather
than a technical, precedent-oriented, one. If the police tie a man to a
pole in the middle of the night and leave him there, their conduct is
unconstitutional even if the case law does not clearly say so.111
Professor Jeffries seems to me to be on the right track, but I am
skeptical of this solution. The problem with it is that, without a change
in the structure of the doctrine, it seems unlikely a shift in emphasis
will necessarily have much impact. As Professor Jeffries admits, “no
mere turn of phrase can avoid hard cases or ensure good decisions.”112
Professor Jeffries’ proposal accepts the Court’s current immunity
framework, in which the doctrine consists of a rule that cuts across all
categories of cases.113 That feature of the doctrine makes it “a relatively
crude tool” for mediating between rights and remedies.114 A more
radical solution to the overinclusiveness costs of Harlow is to abandon
the rule-oriented approach in favor of borrowing from the common
law tort of negligence. Instead of a lack-of-clarity rule, the parties
would be asked to present an array of evidence for a jury to consider.
The judge would instruct the jury to decide whether, in light of all of
the evidence it has heard, the officer violated “clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.”115 By this means, the plaintiff would have an opportunity
to make the case for vindication and deterrence in a wide range of

108. Jeffries, Liability Rule, supra note 22, at 258.
109. Id. at 262.
110. Id. at 263 (emphasis removed); see also John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s Wrong with
Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851, 867–68 (2010) [hereinafter Jeffries, What’s
Wrong] (arguing that a “clearly unconstitutional” rule is superior to the “clearly
established” rule).
111. See Jeffries, Liability Rule, supra note 22, at 255 (discussing Robles v. Prince
George’s Cty., 302 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2002)).
112. Id. at 264.
113. See Fallon, supra note 23, at 480 (noting the “trans-substantive” nature of
immunity doctrine).
114. Id.
115. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
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cases,116 and the defendant would be obliged to persuade the jury that
the fairness and avoidance of overdeterrence concerns should control
in the circumstances of the particular case. In this “ordinary tort”
approach, officers would be obliged to rely on reasons specific to the
case at hand to support their immunity claims, including but not limited
to the lack of clarity of the rights at stake, rather than obtaining dismissal
based on judicial application of the “clearly established law” rule.
To see how this approach might work, consider the facts of Brown v.
Elliott,117 a typical qualified immunity case. Elliott, a police officer,
leaned into the open window of a car at a traffic stop.118 The driver
started the car and when it began to move, Elliott fired a shot, killing
a passenger.119 The victim’s estate sued for a Fourth Amendment
violation, claiming excessive force120 since the relevant precedents had
ruled that an officer violates the Fourth Amendment when he shoots
at a car that is speeding away from him.121 However, Brown held that
those earlier cases did not clearly establish that an officer in Elliott’s
position should not fire his weapon.122 According to the court, the
difference was that in the earlier cases, “the threat to [the officers’]
safety was eliminated and thus could not justify the subsequent
shots.”123 That reasoning may not hold when the officer “was leaning
into the window of a moving truck, not standing off to the side as the
truck passed him without veering in his direction.”124 Qualified
immunity applied even if Elliott used excessive force,125 since the
earlier cases did not clearly establish that proposition.
In the hypothesized “ordinary tort” alternative, the judge would
initially resolve the constitutional issue. If that ruling favored the
116. Of course, one side or the other would sometimes win “as a matter of law,”
because a jury could not reasonably find for the other. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50.
117. 876 F.3d 637 (4th Cir. 2017).
118. Id. at 640.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 639.
121. Id. at 643–44.
122. Id. at 644.
123. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
124. Id.; see also Almighty Supreme Born Allah v. Milling, 876 F.3d 48, 59–60 (2d
Cir. 2017) (applying the qualified immunity doctrine even though a prisoner’s
substantive due process rights were violated because prison officials followed
established practices when they confined the prisoner after making an individualized
finding that the prisoner posed a threat to security).
125. 876 F.3d at 644. The court chose not to address this substantive constitutional
issue. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 239–42 (2009) (giving lower courts the choice
of whether to address the merits of the constitutional claim before the immunity issue).
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plaintiff, the jury would then rule on qualified immunity. Jurors would
consider all of the circumstances surrounding the shooting and the
state of the law at the time to decide whether the officer acted
reasonably in light of “clearly established law” at the time of the
shooting.126 In principle, this approach would solve the problem of
overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness that is endemic to rule-based
decision making, just because the trier of fact would have access to a
much wider array of information and much more discretion to arrive
at the optimum outcome.127 But that solution would come at a heavy
price. One objection to the case-by-case approach is that the judgejury issue is one on which constitutional torts differ in a fundamental
way from common law torts. The leading case on the role of the jury
in adjudicating negligence is Sioux City & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Stout,128
in which the Court said that “twelve men know more of the common
affairs of life than does one man,” and “they can draw wiser and safer
conclusions . . . than can a single judge.”129 This rationale does not
126. A more radical move toward an “ordinary tort” approach would abandon the
“clearly established law” norm in favor of an instruction to the jury on whether the
officer acted “reasonably,” based on all of the circumstances of the incident. That
alternative, unlike the approach this Article advances in Part II, would require a radical
reconstruction of the doctrine.
127. For example, under this approach the officer may escape liability based on the
practice of the agency for which he works. Cf. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 607, 617
(1999) (finding that U.S. Marshals successfully asserted qualified immunity despite a
Fourth Amendment violation for allowing journalists to accompany them in executing
an arrest warrant). In Wilson, the Supreme Court cited, among other things, “reliance
by the United States [M]arshals in this case on a Marshal’s Service ride-along policy
that explicitly contemplated that media who engaged in ride-alongs might enter
private homes.” Id. Should it matter, under an approach that focuses on fault, that
the law is clearly established at the time he acted, but the case that establishes it was
decided so shortly before he acted that a reasonable official would not necessarily have
learned of it? Cf. Doby v. Hickerson, 120 F.3d 111, 113–14 (8th Cir. 1997) (denying
qualified immunity to a prison psychiatrist when the applicable Supreme Court
decision was handed down twenty-two days before he administered anti-psychotic
medications without the prisoner’s consent). Should a lawyer’s advice influence the
qualified immunity determination? See Edward C. Dawson, Qualified Immunity for
Officers’ Reasonable Reliance on Lawyers’ Advice, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 525, 526–27 (2016).
Should it matter whether the officer was at fault at some point in the encounter? Cf.
Cty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1543–44 (2017) (rejecting the Ninth
Circuit’s “provocation rule,” under which officers who use reasonable force may
nonetheless be held liable “on the ground that they committed a separate Fourth
Amendment violation that contributed to their need to use force”).
128. 84 U.S. 657 (1873).
129. Id. at 664. This view remains dominant in tort law. See 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS § 8 cmt. B (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“The jury is assigned the responsibility of
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support jury determinations of whether the constitutional rule was
clearly established at the time an officer violated it. Jurors bring no
particular wealth of expertise to the task of determining the clarity of
constitutional norms.
The viability of the case-by-case approach does not depend solely on
whether juries are competent to adjudicate the “clearly established
law” issue.130 That issue could be left up to the judge. But even if
judges decide whether or not there is a “clearly established law” that
speaks to the issue of qualified immunity, the case-by-case approach
would exacerbate the social costs of constitutional tort litigation, and
particularly the danger of overdeterrence of effective government. In
ordinary tort law, the reasonable care standard is characterized by
“featureless generality,”131 which “introduces a large element of
uncertainty even into ostensibly routine cases.”132 Even when judges,
rather than juries, adjudicate negligence issues, much uncertainty
remains because a range of factors will bear on the decision the judge
must consider. This “ordinary tort” approach may produce excessive
caution on the part of officials across a range of cases in which the
balance between competing factors is uncertain.
A more promising approach is to look for an alternative to Harlow
that will keep the advantages of rules without Harlow’s often severe
misalignment between the rule and the policies. One alternative,
discussed in Part II, is to abandon immunity for a general rule of strict
liability, imposed either on officers or governments.133 Another
alternative, described in Part III, is to reformulate qualified immunity
doctrine by carving out categories of fact patterns in which the case for
immunity is especially strong or weak, in order to retain the value of
immunity while cutting its costs.134 Like Harlow itself, and unlike the
“ordinary tort” hypothesis, both of these alternatives give considerable
weight to the value of rules. However, the main difference between
rendering such judgments partly because several minds are better than one, and also
because of the desirability of taking advantage of the insight and values of the
community, as embodied in the jury, rather than relying on the professional
knowledge of the judge.”); see also Mark P. Gergen, The Jury’s Role in Deciding Normative
Issues in the American Common Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 407, 435 (1999) (discussing the
important role that juries play in deciding normative issues).
130. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (noting that officers’ conduct
should be measured on objective reasonableness).
131. HOLMES, supra note 59, at 89.
132. EPSTEIN & SHARKEY, supra note 59, at 181.
133. See infra Section II.B.1.
134. See infra Sections II.A–B.
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them is that the abolitionist view gives priority to the substantive goals
of vindicating constitutional rights and deterring violations, while the
categorical approach attempts to achieve a balance between the two
sets of goals.135
II. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ABOLISHING OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
Some critics of qualified immunity call for its abolition or severe
curtailment, either directly or by shifting the liability to local
governments.136 Three distinct reasons are advanced in support of this
view. First, Professor William Baude has argued that qualified immunity
is “unlawful,” because neither the text nor the common law
background of § 1983 authorizes the defense.137 Second, various
studies support the conclusion that the empirical foundation on which
the Court bases qualified immunity are weak.138 Third, critics argue
that the Court’s doctrine gives too much weight to the government
official’s interest in immunity and too little weight to the plaintiff’s

135. See infra Part III (arguing that courts can take a middle ground between the
pro-immunity rule camp and the immunity rule abolitionist camp by categorizing
similar fact patterns into “high immunity” and “no immunity” groups).
136. See, e.g., Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, supra note 35, at 1800
(asserting that the “Justices can end qualified immunity in a single decision, and they
should end it now”). Blum quotes several commentators who take one or the other of
these views and adds that she votes “with those who think it is time to revisit Monell and
the Court’s mistaken rejection of respondeat superior liability.” Blum, supra note 35,
at 963; see also JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE
CONSTITUTION 180–81 (3d ed. 2013) (noting that many academic commentators “favor
strict liability either of the officer defendant or the government employer,” and citing
ample authority for that proposition). Note, however, that Professor Jeffries takes the
contrary view. See, e.g., Jeffries, Liability Rule, supra note 22, at 242–50 (discussing “the
case for requiring fault”).
137. See Baude, supra note 24, at 45, 88. Justice Thomas has expressed sympathy for
Baude’s thesis. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1871 (2017) (Thomas, J.,
concurring partly and concurring in the judgment) (endorsing Baude’s position). For
reasons set out elsewhere, I believe Baude is mistaken. See infra Part III.
138. See Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 10 (2017)
[hereinafter Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails] (finding that “qualified immunity
does not affect constitutional litigation against law enforcement in the way the Court
expects and intends); Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885,
889–90 (2014) [hereinafter Schwartz, Police Indemnification] (explaining how
ubiquitous police indemnification undermines the assumption that police will be
“overdeterred” from performing their duties without qualified immunity protecting
them from personal financial liability).

2018]

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AFTER ZIGLAR V. ABBASI

403

interest in recovery.139 This part of the Article uses the “proper
balance” framework to challenge the “empirical evidence” and “value
choices” aspects of the uncompromising “anti-immunity” position. On
both fairness and incentives grounds, the case for an immunity defense
remains strong. Section II.A examines the claim that empirical
findings about the impact of immunity cast doubt on the supposed
benefits of immunity and thereby support radical change in official
immunity law. Section II.B acknowledges the argument that the
imposition of liability on local governments would enable the courts to
capture the vindication and deterrence benefits of liability at little or
no cost, since individual officers would not be liable.
A. The Empirical Case Against Qualified Immunity
Harlow’s version of qualified immunity rests, in part, on two
empirical assumptions: (1) officials will be overly cautious and thus
deterred from acting effectively in the public interest unless they are
shielded from liability for damages; and (2) Harlow’s objective test will
diminish the “social costs” of constitutional tort litigation by permitting
many suits to be dismissed before trial and even without discovery.140
Experience under the Harlow regime raised doubts about both of these
propositions. If in fact the benefits of immunity are small, a strong
case can be made that the resulting reduction in the vindication of
constitutional rights and deterrence of violations, are not worth bearing.
As a result, the argument goes, immunity should be abandoned.
1. Two studies and their implications
Joanna Schwartz, the author of studies that bear on both of the
Court’s empirical assumptions, argues that her work undermines the
premises of qualified immunity in just this way. One of her projects
examined the practice of government indemnification of police
officers held liable for damages for constitutional torts.141 She
gathered information about “litigation payments and indemnification
decisions in forty-four . . . large [law enforcement] departments and
thirty-seven . . . small and mid-sized departments,” which “employ

139. Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified
Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of
Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV.
1219, 1245 (2015).
140. See supra notes 64–69 and accompanying text.
141. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, supra note 138, at 889.
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approximately [twenty percent] of law enforcement officers across the
country.”142 She found that “[p]olice officers are virtually always
indemnified.”143 That is, when they are held liable under § 1983, their
employers pay the judgments.144 To the extent her findings are valid
and can be generalized to other government officers, they diminish
the concern that officers need immunity or else they will act timidly for
fear of liability.145 After all, if officers do not actually pay damages, they
will likely act less cautiously.
A recent study, conducted by Professor Schwartz, examines whether
the Court in Harlow had a valid concern when it eliminated the
subjective “bad faith” prong of official immunity.146 According to
Harlow, “substantial costs attend the litigation of the subjective good
faith of government officials.”147 These include “the general costs of
subjecting officials to the risks of trial,” the difficulty of deciding
“subjective intent” on summary judgment, and “broad-ranging
discovery and the deposing of numerous persons,” inquiries which
“can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government.”148 Schwartz
“reviewed the dockets of 1183 lawsuits filed against state and local law
enforcement defendants over a two-year period in five federal district
courts” from Texas, Florida, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and California,149 and
found that “just 0.6% of cases [against law enforcement defendants]

142. Id.
143. Id. at 890.
144. For a discussion of some of the state law issues raised by indemnification
statues, see Bryson v. City of Oklahoma City, 627 F.3d 784, 791–92 (10th Cir. 2010)
(holding that the Oklahoma statute does not allow the injured plaintiff to obtain
indemnification payments directly from municipalities).
145. Other studies reach similar conclusions. See, e.g., Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking
Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Officials’ Individual Liability Under Bivens,
88 GEO. L.J. 65, 77–78 (1999) (finding that most federal officials are indemnified);
Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1675–76, 1675 n.389
(2003) (discussing indemnification of corrections officers); Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths
and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57
UCLA L. REV. 1023 (2010) (finding that law enforcement agencies rarely gather and
analyze information from lawsuits brought against them and their officers). Note that
indemnification is always an option for governments seeking the benefits of bold,
effective action by its officers and the avoidance of overdeterrence. The point is that,
even if immunity is denied, a government can always choose to buy some of the
benefits it is thought to bring.
146. See generally Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, supra note 138, at 9.
147. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982).
148. Id. at 816–17.
149. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, supra note 138, at 9.
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were dismissed at the motion to dismiss stage and 2.6% were dismissed
at summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.”150 Though
immunity still blocks relief in many cases and discourages prospective
plaintiffs from bringing suits, Schwartz’s findings suggest that the
Harlow test may well not diminish the costs of constitutional tort
litigation by as much as the Court had expected.
Professor Schwartz’s findings challenge the viability of the current
qualified immunity doctrine. The Court has said that the “‘clearly
established’ standard protects the balance between vindication of
constitutional rights and government officials’ effective performance
of their duties.”151 Put in terms of the cost-benefit model the Court has
endorsed, the indemnification study suggests that the “avoidance of
overdeterrence” benefits of immunity are smaller than had been
anticipated. That goal is already served by government reimbursement.
Even before Schwartz’s indemnification study, the Court acknowledged
the relation between indemnification and the anti-overdeterrence
policy.152 It took account of the anti-immunity implications of
indemnification when it rejected qualified immunity for private prison
officers sued under § 1983, in part because they could be indemnified
by their employers.153 Professor Schwartz’s second paper on the impact
of Harlow on social costs, suggests that the “avoidance of trial and
discovery” benefits of the elimination of the subjective prong are
small.154 Professor Schwartz’s empirical studies thus cast doubt on the
Court’s assessment of the cost and benefits of qualified immunity and
suggest that the costs imposed override what little benefits qualified
immunity provides.

150. Id. at 10. See, e.g., Greer v. City of Highland Park, 884 F.3d 310, 316–18 (6th Cir.
2018) (plaintiffs’ factual allegations are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss the
complaint for a Fourth Amendment violation); Bonivert v. City of Clarkston, 883 F.3d
865, 881 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that issues of fact preclude summary judgment on the
plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims); Avina v. Bohlen, 882 F.3d 674, 678–79 (7th Cir.
2018) (reversing summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff’s excessive force claim
because there were issues of fact as to the reasonableness of the force used).
151. Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012).
152. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 411 (1997) (noting that
indemnification mitigates the concern that officials are not deterred from service by
the threat of private liability for damages).
153. Id. (contending that indemnification weighs against extending qualified
immunity to private actors). But cf. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 n.3
(1987) (suggesting that evidence of indemnification of officials would not justify
elimination of qualified immunity).
154. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, supra note 138, at 73.

406

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:379

2. Skepticism about empiricism
Though empirical studies of constitutional tort litigation deserve
attention, they cannot by themselves resolve the qualified-immunity
issue. Professor Schwartz focuses on law enforcement. Studies of other
contexts, or scholars using other methodologies, may produce
different outcomes. In addition, it is important to distinguish between
the question of whether qualified immunity provides a cost or benefit
and the question of how great that cost or benefit might be. Showing
that indemnification decreases timidity does not suffice to show that
timidity is an insignificant concern.155 Showing that social costs remain
despite Harlow does not suffice to show that they would not be greater
without Harlow. Even if Schwartz’s findings are valid across the whole
field of constitutional tort litigation, as I suspect they are, other
rationales for immunity remain valid. Professor Jeffries, in particular,
has argued that immunity from damages “fosters the development of
constitutional law . . . by reducing the costs of innovation.”156 Professor
Fallon posits an “Equilibration Thesis,” which holds that “courts
charged with implementing constitutional rights or values sometimes
view justiciability doctrines, merits doctrines, and remedial doctrines
as an integrated unit.”157 An implication of this thesis is that
eliminating qualified immunity could result in dilution of the content
of substantive constitutional rights.158
In addition, the idea that empirical studies might justify massive
doctrinal change ignores the institutional role judges play in
amending doctrine. Qualified immunity is a judge-made doctrine159
155. For example, officers may want to avoid adverse publicity, or they may be
concerned that liability will get them fired or at least hinder career advancement, or
liability may have some collateral consequence, such as inability to obtain a mortgage.
These possibilities emerged from interviews conducted by Professors Lewis and Eaton,
in which they asked defense attorneys why officers did not make “offers of judgment”
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. For a description of the study, see Harold S.
Lewis, Jr. & Thomas A. Eaton, Of Offers Not (Frequently) Made and (Rarely) Accepted: The
Mystery of Federal Rule 68, 57 MERCER L. REV. 723, 738–40 (2006) (introducing a
symposium on Rule 68). The relevant interview responses are described by Professor
Eaton in a transcript of the conference proceedings. See Transcript—Session One:
Background and Federal Judicial Interpretation of Rule 68, 57 MERCER L. REV. 743, 754 (2006).
156. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87,
90 (1999) [hereinafter Jeffries, Right-Remedy Gap].
157. Fallon, supra note 23, at 482.
158. See id. at 486 (“[I]t now seems to me deeply mistaken to think that we can
realistically imagine a world in which official immunity doctrines were abolished and
in which further, equilibrating adjustments . . . did not also occur.”).
159. See Levin & Wells, supra note 24.
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and is certainly as subject to judicial reexamination as any other
common-law doctrine. But it is also intimately connected to the law of
constitutional remedies. Its abrupt termination would threaten the
process values that inhere in the common law tradition, which favors
incremental rather than abrupt change in judge-made law.160 In most
instances, courts can and should respond to new information and new
conditions with incremental adaptation.161 That is the point of
Holmes’ aphorism that “[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has
been experience.”162 The Court in Harlow acted in the spirit of this
precept, even if it acted mistakenly, when it dropped the bad-faith
prong of the qualified immunity doctrine based on its sense that “[t]he
subjective element . . . has proved incompatible with our admonition
. . . that insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial.”163 It was “now
clear that substantial costs attend the litigation of the subjective good
faith of government officials.”164 Taking the incremental approach of
the common law, the Court retained other components of the
qualified immunity defense while eliminating the subjective prong.165
Professor Schwartz’s findings suggest that the Court in Harlow may
have been mistaken in thinking it had found a remedy for the problem
it tried to solve. But the more realistic, and prudent, goal is not to
eliminate qualified immunity—it is to undo the specific holding of
Harlow and reinstate the bad faith prong. That is one element of the
categorical approach described in Part III. In this and other respects,
the categorical approach is more consistent with the norms of common
law adjudication, as it modifies rather than uproots the current doctrine.

160. See Robert E. Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REV.
463, 472–73 (1962) (“It is part of the common law tradition . . . that in so far as these
breaks with precedent are accomplished by judicial decision rather than by statute they
are in the nature of adjustment and adaptation of segments of doctrine. The more
comprehensive breaks with the past are accomplished by statute, and the courts
exercise their power of overruling precedent under an obligation of restraint.”).
161. See ROBERT E. KEETON, VENTURING TO DO JUSTICE: REFORMING PRIVATE LAW 54–
63 (1969) (discussing “evolutionary revision of legal doctrine in courts”). For more
illustrations of this principle, see MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON
LAW 107–08 (1988), which illustrates this theme with the charitable immunity doctrine
and EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 9–27 (1949), describing
the incremental changes that led to manufacturer liability for defective products.
162. HOLMES, supra note 59, at 5.
163. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–16 (1982).
164. Id. at 816.
165. Id. at 818.
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3. Empirical studies and the fairness rationale
Professor Schwartz’s findings have no bearing on the fairness
rationale for qualified immunity. From a fairness perspective, it does
not matter whether the defense actually achieves the goal of reducing
social costs. The fairness rationale bases the defense on “the injustice,
particularly in the absence of bad faith,”166 of imposing liability on an
officer in the absence of “fair warning” that his act violates a
constitutional right.167 The core of this rationale is that when the law
or the application of law to fact is unclear, it is unfair to impose liability
on an official who, as a result, cannot reasonably foresee that his act
violates the plaintiff’s constitutional right.168 As Holmes put the point
in his defense of the negligence principle, “[a] choice which entails a
concealed consequence is as to that consequence no choice.”169 This
objection to liability does not depend on whether the “social costs” of
constitutional tort litigation are diminished by qualified immunity.
Nor is it necessarily met by findings that officers are typically
indemnified. Liability may have other consequences for the officer’s
future employment prospects or personal life. Even if it does not, the
vindication goal applies to both sides of the constitutional tort suit. An
officer who is charged with a constitutional violation has a legitimate
interest in vindication of his actions. The fact that he is indemnified
does not eliminate the unfairness of liability without fault.
If Professor Schwartz’s findings are confirmed, the likely (and, in my
view, the appropriate) impact will not be abandonment, but rather
reconstruction of qualified immunity, with greater emphasis on the
dynamics of Professor Jeffries’ “right-remedy gap” and on the fairness
rationale. Framed in cost-benefit terms, what she has shown is that that
the benefits of immunity in cutting social costs are not as great as the
166. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974).
167. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740 (2002).
168. See HOLMES, supra note 59, at 77. It might be thought that the reference to the
negligence principle is mistaken, because the officer actually commits an intentional
tort when he deliberately uses force, or deliberately confines someone, or deliberately
fires a government employee. But the state of mind question for the purpose of official
immunity for constitutional torts is the officer’s ability to appreciate that he is invading
a constitutionally protected interest. Consider, for example, a hypothetical in which
(1) an officer deliberately uses force against the plaintiff and believes that the force is
appropriate; (2) the force is ultimately determined to be excessive, in violation of the
Fourth Amendment; but (3) the officer had no fair warning that the force is excessive.
The officer has violated a constitutional right, but he has not intended to violate the
right, nor has he negligently done so.
169. HOLMES, supra note 59, at 76.
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Court has thought them to be.170 She has made the case for a less
defendant-friendly doctrine, perhaps along the lines discussed in Part III.171
B.

Local Government Liability

Many proponents of liability unfettered by immunity sidestep the
fairness-to-officials objection. They propose that local governments172
be held liable for constitutional violations committed by their
employees.173 This proposal would extend liability well beyond current
practice as well as current law. First, § 1983 does not entitle any officer
to indemnification.174 Second, under the current indemnification
practice, governments typically pay for some of their employees’
constitutional torts, but not all of them.175 Under the current regime,
they do not pay for violations of constitutional rights as to which the
officer successfully asserts immunity.176 However, the “broad liability”
argument holds that local governments should be liable for all violations.177

170. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, supra note 138, at 58–59.
171. Id.
172. The discussion here focuses solely on local governments because neither state
governments nor the United States can be sued at all under § 1983. Suits against the
United States and federal officers are generally precluded because the statute by its
terms requires action “under color of state law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). Suits against
states are precluded by Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979), which held that in enacting
the statute Congress did not abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity. Id. at 341.
173. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 35, at 811–13; see also supra note 172.
174. See Allen v. City of Los Angeles, 92 F.3d 842, 845 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996). Cf. Davis
v. Coakley, 802 F.3d 128, 132–35 (1st Cir. 2015) (upholding refusal to indemnify an
officer for punitive damages); Payne v. Jones, 711 F.3d 85, 95 n.7 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing
cases where public servants were not indemnified).
175. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police
Reform, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144, 1176 (2016).
176. See, e.g., Schwartz, Police Indemnification, supra note 138, at 890.
177. As described below, this goal may be partially accomplished through broader
local government liability. Full government accountability would require imposing
liability on state governments as well. At present, state governments cannot be sued at
all, at least not by name and not for retrospective relief, because they are not deemed
to be “persons” subject to suit within the meaning of § 1983, which imposes liability on
“[e]very person” who violates rights. See Quern, 440 U.S. at 350. Quern is not a simple
statutory ruling. It is based on the Eleventh Amendment principle that Congress may
not impose liability on states unless the statute contains a clear statement that states
may be sued. Id. at 343. It would be a challenge to read § 1983 to contain such a clear
statement. The statute imposes liability on “[e]very person” who violates rights,
without specifying that states may be sued. Sometimes an issue arises as to whether a
particular officer, in carrying out a particular function, is a state or local actor. See,
e.g., McMillian v. Monroe Cty., 520 U.S. 781, 794 (1997) (holding that, in the
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A defense of the categorical approach advocated in this Article
cannot be complete without an examination of this alternative.
Indemnification aside, the current doctrine imposes damages liability
on local governments only in a limited range of circumstances.178 The
leading case is Monell v. Department of Social Services,179 which holds local
governments liable for constitutional violations caused by their
“official policy” or “customs,”180 categories that the courts generally
read narrowly. Under the Court’s interpretation of § 1983 in Monell,
local governments are not vicariously liable in suits for constitutional
torts committed by their employees.181 In so holding, the Court
focused on the language of § 1983 as originally passed, which held
liable persons who “shall subject, or cause to be subjected any person”
to the deprivation of rights.182 According to the Court, this language
“cannot be easily read to impose liability vicariously on governing
bodies solely on the basis of the existence of an employer-employee
relationship with a tortfeasor.”183 This is the rule that would need to
be changed in order to expand liability for constitutional torts without
lifting official immunity.184 Given that Monell is a statutory precedent,
not federal common law, the “institutional role” case against
overruling the no vicarious liability holding may be stronger than with
other constitutional tort issues.185

circumstances, the Monroe County Sheriff was acting for the state, so that Monroe
County could not be sued for his violation).
178. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
179. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
180. See id. at 691–92, 694–95.
181. Id. at 694.
182. Section 1983 was originally passed as the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to assist the
government in combatting Ku Klux Klan violence in the South after the Civil War.
Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
183. Monell, 436 U.S. at 692.
184. Some members of the Court have called for reexamination of the “no vicarious
liability” rule. See Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 430–37
(1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). In this opinion, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg, argues for reexamination of that aspect of Monell. See Shields v.
Ill. Dep’t. of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 791–92 (7th Cir. 2014) (questioning Monell’s
reasoning). Scholars, too, have questioned Monell’s reasoning, especially its use of
legislative history. See, e.g., Larry Kramer & Alan O. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under
§ 1983: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 249, 255–61 (1987).
185. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361,
1362 (1988) (noting that “[s]tatutory precedents . . . often enjoy a super-strong
presumption of correctness”).
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If Monell’s “no vicarious liability” doctrine was overruled, local
governments would be generally liable for their employees’ violations
of constitutional rights. However, Owen v. City of Independence186 held
that the municipal government has no immunity defense—so the
combined effect of Owen and Monell is that local governments are liable
without fault, but they are liable only when the plaintiff can meet the
“policy or custom” requirement.187 To see how the proposal to institute
vicarious liability would alter the current regime, it is helpful to briefly
sketch in a rough way the distinction drawn by Monell and its progeny
between “policy and custom,” for which governments are liable, and
the other constitutional torts, for which governments are not liable.
Consider a hypothetical case in which a municipal police officer uses
a taser on a motorist at a traffic stop, and the tasing is found to be
excessive force in violation of the motorist’s Fourth Amendment
rights.188 Under the current approach, is the officer’s employer, the
city, is liable if its written or unwritten policy authorizes police officers
to use tasers without special need,189 but not if it has no such policy and
an officer uses a taser without the necessary justification.190 The city
may be liable in the absence of a written policy allowing indiscriminate
use of tasers, if the plaintiff can show that a “final policymaker,” such
as the police chief, has directed officers to use them,191 or if the chief
knows about a “custom” among police officers and tolerates it.192 The
local government may also be liable under Monell on an “inadequate
training” theory if the plaintiff can show that officers have not received
minimally adequate training and that this lack of training caused the
violation.193 Unless the plaintiff can bring his case within one of these
categories, he has no legal right to relief from the local government.

186. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
187. Id. at 638.
188. For illustrations of issues raised in stun gun litigation, see, for example, Brand
v. Casal, 877 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2017); and Jones v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department, 873 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2017).
189. See Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1096–97 (9th Cir. 2013).
190. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (holding that
officers are only liable for constitutional violations when they are carried out in
accordance with official policy).
191. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986); see, e.g., Kristofek v.
Village of Orland Hills, 712 F.3d 979, 987 (7th Cir. 2013).
192. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997); see, e.g., Jackson v.
Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 763 (9th Cir. 2014).
193. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989); see also Brown, 520 U.S. at
411 (recognizing an “inadequate hiring” theory).
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The anti-immunity school would combine retention of Owen with
reversal of the “no vicarious liability” rule. The city would be liable in
all of the above scenarios, for any unconstitutional use of a taser,
whether or not the law on taser use was clearly established, and
whether or not the tasing was authorized by an ordinance, pursuant to
a custom, approved by a policymaker, or the result of bad training. Put
in terms of costs and benefits, the major advantages of this approach
are, first, that rights are generally vindicated, more or less across the
board, at least so long as the case involves acts by local government
employees and not by state government officers.194
Second,
governments will internalize the costs of constitutional violations, and
will thus have proper incentives to minimize them.195 With respect to
costs, the Court said in Owen that the “inhibiting effect” of the threat
of liability “is significantly reduced, if not eliminated . . . when the
threat of personal liability is removed.”196 Unfairness “is simply not
implicated when the damages award comes not from the official’s
pocket, but from the public treasury.”197
1. Incentives
Professor Alan Sykes’ economic analysis of ordinary tort law provides
some support for the imposition of vicarious liability on governments
for all constitutional violations committed by their employees in the
course of employment.198 Summarizing Sykes’ study, Professors
Richard Epstein and Catherine Sharkey state that “[a]s between the
employer and employee . . . the employer is usually the superior riskbearer because of its greater access to insurance markets,” that
“vicarious liability . . . reduces the risk that the insolvency of a particular

194. See Owen v. City of Indep., 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980) (“A damages remedy
against the offending party is a vital component of any scheme for vindicating
cherished constitutional guarantees, and the importance of assuring its efficacy is only
accentuated when the wrongdoer is the institution that has been established to protect
the vey rights it has transgressed.”).
195. Id. at 651–52 (“The knowledge that a municipality will be liable for all of its
injurious conduct, whether committed in good faith or not, should create an incentive
for officials who may harbor doubts about the lawfulness of their intended actions to
err on the side of protecting citizens’ constitutional rights . . . [and] may encourage
those in a policymaking position to institute internal rules . . . designed to minimize
the likelihood of unintentional infringements on constitutional rights.”).
196. Id. at 656.
197. Id. at 654.
198. See Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231 (1984).
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employee will impose an uncompensated risk on a third party.”199
Additionally, they found that “the doctrine reduces the need to have
an extensive network of voluntary contracts between employees and
employers,” and that “vicarious liability protects third parties who
know that some firm employee is responsible for the loss, but cannot
determine which one is responsible.”200 These rationales for vicarious
liability seem equally applicable to constitutional torts, since the
employer-employee relationship is similar to that of a private business.
Still, the adoption of government strict liability would not eliminate all
constitutional violations by local government officers, even if the
incentives created by the liability rule work perfectly. Even in a strict
liability regime, private businesses will take precautions only when the
gain in accident prevention is greater than the cost of the
precaution.201 In the same way, a rational, wealth maximizing
government would only stop the constitutional violations that cost the
city more (in damages and litigation expenses) than the cost of
preventing them, even if it were liable for all of violations. From an
economic perspective, some constitutional violations, like some
accidents, are not worth preventing.202
In addition, there are three incentive-based reasons to doubt
whether the private law model can simply be transplanted into
constitutional torts with no allowance for the officer’s fault or lack of
it. One is that the problem of officials’ self-protective behavior does
not vanish just because officials are not personally liable. Larry Kramer
and Professor Sykes have examined municipal liability from an
incentives-based perspective.203 Strict liability would have both pluses
and minuses, because “[t]he prospect of liability will discourage
actions that would ultimately prove constitutional as well as actions that
199. EPSTEIN & SHARKEY, supra note 59, at 629.
200. Id.
201. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 175 (4th ed. 1992) (noting that,
under a cost-benefit test, “if [burden of precaution] is larger than [probable loss], the strictly
liable defendant will not take precautions, just as under negligence”). It is doubtful that
imposing liability despite lack of reasonable foreseeability will produce significant deterrence.
See, e.g., Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 923 (Mass. 1998) (rejecting
liability to warn of product risks “that were not capable of being known”).
202. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation
of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 369 (2000); see also GUIDO CALABRESI, THE
COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 17–21 (1970) (repudiating the
“myth” that society seeks to avoid accidents at all costs); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of
Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32–33 (1972).
203. See Kramer & Sykes, supra note 184, at 251, 267.
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would ultimately prove unconstitutional.”204 Given the tradeoff, it is
“impossible to know whether the inefficiencies of self-protective
behavior by municipalities will exceed the efficiencies associated with
a reduced number of constitutional torts.”205 Consequently, “the
efficiency of municipal liability for good faith constitutional torts is
very much in doubt.”206
The second reason for skepticism about the private-to-public
transplant is that the kinds of incentives that matter to private actors
may differ from the ones that count the most for government officials.
In theory, if not always in practice, a private business bears the costs
and captures the benefits of precautions and therefore will give those
costs the weight they deserve in decision making. Government
policymakers may not respond to the incentives created by liability
rules in the same way businesses and individuals do.207 Among other
differences, “[g]overnment does not behave like a wealth-maximizer .
. . [r]ather, government internalizes only political incentives.”208 For
example, a police commissioner may further his own interests in
getting reelected by unduly vigorous policing, with the constitutional
tort costs paid for by taxpayers.
The third problem with transplanting the private law respondeat
superior model is based on Professor Jeffries’ insight that a rightremedy gap serves the systemic value in constitutional innovation.209 A
static cost-benefit calculation cannot take the long run gain into
account. A dynamic model is required. Over time, the effect of
blanket local government liability would increase the costs of
recognizing new constitutional protections and of maintaining the
current ones. Professor Fallon’s “Equilibration Thesis” suggests that
rights may be defined in ways that produce less rather than more
constitutional protection.210 According to Professor Jeffries, a limit on
the availability of damages lowers the costs of recognizing new rights,
and thereby “facilitates constitutional innovation and favors the
future.”211 Some form of qualified immunity and some limits on local
government liability may be justified even though “underdeterrence of
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 299.
Id. at 299–300.
Id. at 300.
See Levinson, supra note 202, at 348–57.
Id. at 357.
Jeffries, Right-Remedy Gap, supra note 156, at 113.
Fallon, supra note 23, at 482.
Jeffries, Right-Remedy Gap, supra note 156, at 91.
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constitutional violations is a cost and must be counted as such.”212 If
Fallon and Jeffries are correct, the costs of a shift to strict government
liability may be far larger than the critics of immunity suppose. The
Court might define constitutional rights more narrowly if the
monetary costs of rights were higher, and the result could be a weaker
rather than a stronger set of constitutional guarantees.213
2. Fairness
Fairness is not at issue when beneficiaries’ money damages is
awarded from the public treasury. In Owen, the Court dismissed the
notion that the value of fairness should constrain government
liability.214 The “public at large” gets “the benefits of the government’s
activities,” and “the public treasury” should pay the constitutional tort
costs of those activities.215 He feared that harmful § 1983 judgments
could endanger local governments and consequently could impose
“severe limitation[s] on their ability to serve the public.”216 In a long
dissenting opinion, Justice Powell briefly addressed this topic,
suggesting that “ruinous judgments” under § 1983 could be harmful to
local governments, and could inflict “severe limitations” on their ability
to serve the public.”217
Justice Powell’s brief rejoinder relates only to the scope of “policy
and custom” liability. As intended, he does not fully and precisely
articulate the fairness objection to governmental liability for
constitutional torts when unlimited by either policy or custom or any
immunity defense. The point is not just that liability will threaten
government finances.
If a government acts in disregard for
constitutional rights often enough and flagrantly enough, it may
deserve to collapse under the weight of constitutional tort judgments.
The stronger rationale for a fault rule is that the ethical objection to
liability without fault applies to municipalities as well as to officers.
Government is not an abstraction. It is the sum of all the persons who
contribute to it and benefit from it. Thus, Owen’s strict liability rule,

212. Id.
213. See Fallon, supra note 23, at 481. Fallon elaborates: “[T]he social costs of rights
and causes of action that have led the courts to develop immunity doctrines in our
actual world would impel other, compensating changes in the law if immunity were
abolished.” Id. at 486.
214. See Owen v. City of Indep., 445 U.S. 622, 653 n.37 (1980).
215. Id. at 654–55.
216. Id. at 655.
217. Id.
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even in its current limited form, favors the successful constitutional
tort plaintiff over all other claims on government monies, including
not only taxpayers but also the beneficiaries of government programs.
Call this group “ordinary citizens” for short. The issue is which of these
two groups—victims of constitutional violations or ordinary citizens—
should, as a matter of fairness, bear the losses due to actions that are
arguably proper at the time they are taken but are found to be
constitutional violations with the benefit of hindsight.
Professor Daryl Levinson has asserted that “taxpayers do not ‘cause’
constitutional violations in any intuitive sense of causation, nor are
they morally responsible for constitutional wrongdoing.”218 One need
not go that far in order to defend a fault rule. When government,
through its employees, has fair notice that the acts of those employees
may cross a constitutional line, the pro-plaintiff policies—vindication
of constitutional rights and deterrence of violations—provide strong
support for municipal liability. Holding taxpayers, as well as the
beneficiaries of government, accountable for the faulty actions of
government officials is fair despite the taxpayers’ and beneficiaries’
lack of responsibility for those acts. But when notice is lacking, it seems
as unfair to impose liability on the ordinary citizens who finance and
benefit from government as it is on the officer who unknowingly
commits the violation. The facts of Owen are illustrative of such
inequity. The City Council fired Owen, the chief of police, at a time
when Supreme Court doctrine appeared to allow it to do so.219 A few
months later, the Supreme Court held, for the first time, that an
employee like Owen may hold “property” and “liberty” interests
protected by the Due Process Clause, and therefore may be entitled to
a “due process” hearing in connection with dismissal.220 The City of
Independence violated Owen’s rights, but the City and those it
represented did not have fair notice that it had done so. The fairness
objection to liability is that, incentive effects aside, it is not fair to hold
a government liable for an act, just as it is unfair to hold an individual
officer liable, without notice that the act may violate constitutional
norms. It is not fair because the government is nothing more than the
218. Levinson, supra note 202, at 408.
219. Owen, 445 U.S. at 629.
220. Compare Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573, 578 (1972) (recognizing
that a plaintiff may be entitled to a hearing where his or her reputation or integrity is
at stake, but failing to find that in the instant case), with Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593, 599 (1972) (holding that the teacher’s due process rights may have been violated
because he had enough facts to show a deprivation of property).
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sum of all the people who pay for it and receive services from it, and
strict liability holds all of them liable despite the lack of notice that
they, through their government, were doing anything wrong.221
III. A CATEGORICAL APPROACH
This Part of the Article describes and defends a middle ground
between the Court’s broad pro-immunity rule and the abolitionist
view—what I call the “categorical approach.” The foundations of the
argument lie in the principles developed in Parts I and II. One
premise is that fairness and utility favor an immunity defense, but not
necessarily the current regime’s interpretation of the immunity
doctrine, within which defendants win even if the unconstitutionality
of their acts is clear. Another premise of the categorical approach is
that the predictability and stability benefits of rules counsel against
borrowing “ordinary tort” principles, but they do not necessarily
require an immunity rule as broad as the rule of Harlow. The better
path would be to retain the value of rule-based decision making by a
categorical approach, in which distinctions would be drawn among fact
patterns on the basis of one or a few features that justify putting them
in a “no immunity” category or in a “high immunity” category.
Qualified immunity is analogous to the categorical approach of First
Amendment doctrine, in which some categories of speech receive a
higher level of protection than others. In both areas, “[c]ategorization
has the attraction of clarity and of providing guidance to judges and
other government officials.”222 Thus, the aim of making contextual
distinctions is to carve out categories in which immunity would be
denied, as well as categories in which the policies favoring immunity are
powerful enough to justify a stronger, even an absolute, immunity.223
221. Cf. Fallon, supra note 23, at 498 (suggesting that “establishing sensible
standards for municipal liability” would include not only vicarious liability but also
“displacement of the holding in Owen,” to “permit otherwise suable entities to benefit
in litigation from having good internal mechanisms for training their officials to
respect constitutional norms and for disciplining those who run amok”).
222. SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 20, at 945–46 (explaining that the categorical
approach to First Amendment doctrine “strives for ‘bright-line’ rules” to help determine
when certain facts may trigger government justification before speech regulation).
223. Other techniques are also worth consideration. In some contexts, the optimal
approach may be to concentrate on the way substantive constitutional law is
formulated, see, for example, Fallon, supra note 23, at 490 (“In theory, it would be
possible for the Supreme Court (or Congress) to make immunity . . . depend on the
right that the official allegedly violated”); John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating
Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 280, 281 (2000) (arguing that “the liability rule
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The categorical approach gives weight to the specific factual and legal
context in which an immunity issue arises.224 The question one asks in
setting up categories is whether the policies on either side of the costbenefit equation are comparatively strong or weak in a particular
context. Section III.A discusses categories of cases in which the costbenefit case for qualified immunity is especially weak. Section III.B turns
to fact patterns in which the cost-benefit calculus may be so one-sided in
the other direction that it supports even the award of absolute immunity.
This Article’s claim is not that this categorical approach would
resolve all of the current objections to qualified immunity. Some cases,
for example Brown v. Elliott,225 do not fall within any of the special
categories this Article identifies. As a result, Harlow would continue to
govern those cases. In some fact patterns, issues would arise as to
which, if any, of the categories may apply. Some fact patterns will raise
hard issues about which category the case falls into. Some fact patterns
may push for inclusion in both an expansive and a restrictive category.
In these ways, the categorical approach adds complexity to the
doctrine. But it would also provide useful guidance and structure to
the analysis of qualified immunity issues. The benefits of a more finetuned approach are, on balance, worth the added complications.
A. Six Weak Immunity Categories
This Section describes six fact patterns in which the pro-immunity
policies of fairness to defendants and avoiding overdeterrence are
comparatively weak. In terms of the “proper balance” between the costs
and benefits of immunity, this pattern of weakness does most of the work
of justifying exceptions to Harlow. The anti-immunity goals of vindicating
constitutional rights and deterring subsequent violations seem more or

for money damages should vary with the constitutional violation at issue,” and, “[t]o
that end, qualified immunity should lose its fixed doctrinal content”). For discussion
of contexts in which a right-specific approach may be feasible, see Michael L. Wells,
Scott v. Harris and the Role of the Jury in Constitutional Litigation, 29 REV. LIT. 65, 97–98
(2009) (arguing that Fourth Amendment “excessive force” doctrine should be more
rule-oriented); Michael L. Wells, Section 1983, the First Amendment, and Public Employee
Speech: Shaping the Right to Fit the Remedy (and Vice Versa), 35 GA. L. REV. 939, 944 (2001)
(arguing that the First Amendment rights of public employees should be more rulelike and less governed by balancing tests).
224. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 117–118.
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less constant across most of these categories.226 Thus, the relative strength
of vindication and deterrence is greater in these fact patterns.
1. Collateral issues
Ziglar falls into a category in which the case for immunity is
unconvincing. When the lack of clarity relates to an issue other than
the constitutional or statutory validity of the officer’s conduct, the
fairness and “social costs” arguments are weak, if they exist at all. The
complaint in Ziglar alleged equal protection violations that were clearly
established at the time the officials acted.227 They had the “fair
warning” to which defendants are entitled, and their conduct did not
put them to a choice between excessive caution and bold, effective
government action.228 The uncertainty related only to whether the
defendants could be sued under the conspiracy statute for conduct
that they and everyone else know is unconstitutional.229 It is not farfetched to compare immunity based on that lack of certainty to lack of
certainty as to whether the plaintiff can obtain personal jurisdiction,
or as to whether “state action” is present. The argument for a
categorical rule that excludes a defense is that the cost-benefit balance
favors the plaintiff’s side across the whole set of such “collateral issue”
cases. Given the weak pro-immunity policies, the pro-plaintiff goals of
vindication of rights and deterring constitutional violations should
control the outcomes in this set of cases.
The facts of Hernandez v. Mesa,230 decided a week after Ziglar,
illustrate the aforementioned situation where pro-plaintiff goals
should control the outcome. In that case, Jesus Mesa, a United States
border guard standing on the United States side of the Mexican
border, shot and killed Jesus Hernandez, an unarmed fifteen-year-old
Mexican boy, who was standing on the Mexican side of the border.231
The boy’s parents brought a Bivens suit, in which they alleged violations
of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.232 In the per curiam
opinion, the Court remanded for consideration of the Bivens issue in

226. Note, however, that those goals may be especially strong when the plaintiff can
establish the officer’s bad faith, which is the second of the six fact patterns.
227. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
229. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1866–67 (2017).
230. 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (per curiam).
231. Id. at 2004.
232. Id. at 2005.
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light of Ziglar.233 Additionally, the Court reviewed the lower court’s
ruling “that Mesa was entitled to qualified immunity,”234 on the Fifth
Amendment claim because of lack of clarity as to the applicability of
the Fifth Amendment to a cross-border shooting of a non-U.S. citizen.235
Uncertainty on that issue is collateral to the duties imposed on Mesa
by the Fifth Amendment. The outcome should turn on whether the
Fifth Amendment rules are sufficiently clear. The Fifth Amendment
claim is that the shooting was a deprivation of Hernandez’s liberty
without due process of law, in violation of the substantive component
of due process.236 The leading case is Sacramento County v. Lewis.237 In
that case, the Court denied liability because the injury was not
intentional, but it also said that “conduct intended to injure in some
way unjustifiable by any government interest is the sort of official
action most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level” that would
Even if Fifth Amendment
offend substantive due process.238
protections are less stringent at the border,239 that rule may be
sufficiently clear and broad to enable Hernandez’s parents to
overcome a qualified immunity defense, provided they can prove that
the shooting was unprovoked.240 For present purposes, however, that
issue can be set aside. The thrust of this Article’s argument is that the
lack of clarity on which the lower court relied—as to whether the Fifth
Amendment applies at all to cross-border shootings—is collateral to
the fairness and avoidance of overdeterrence rationales for immunity.

233. Id. at 2006–07. On remand, the Fifth Circuit held that a foreign national may
not sue federal law enforcement officials under Bivens for an injury that occurs on
foreign soil. Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811, 823 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc).
234. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 2007.
235. See Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d 117, 120–21 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc)
(per curiam).
236. Id. at 120.
237. 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
238. Id. at 849.
239. Cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 755–64 (2008) (discussing the
extraterritorial application of the Constitution).
240. The per curiam opinion in Hernandez noted that “Hernandez’s nationality and
the extent of his ties to the United States were unknown to Mesa at the time of the
shooting. The en banc Court of Appeals therefore erred in granting qualified
immunity based on those facts.” Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2007 (2017).
The significance of this reference to Mesa’s lack of knowledge of Hernandez’s ties to
the United States is not spelled out in the opinion. The Court may have intended to
say that Mesa’s lack of knowledge would preclude official immunity, such that the
shooting clearly violated the Fifth Amendment, no matter what those ties were.
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2. The relevance of “bad faith”
Harlow held that officers are immune from damages unless they
violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.”241 This canonical statement of
the rule leaves open an important question: What if an officer believes
he is violating the Constitution, and in fact he is violating the
Constitution, even though a reasonable officer in his position would
not have known? Two sentences in the majority opinion suggest that
the officer cannot assert immunity if he “knew or reasonably should
have known” his act violates the plaintiff’s constitutional right.242
Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion joined by Justices Marshall
and Blackmun, cites those sentences in support of a rule that the
Harlow “standard would not allow the official who actually knows that
he was violating the law to escape liability.”243 On the other hand, some
aspects of Justice Powell’s opinion for the Court pointed in the other
direction. Its main theme was that the bad faith prong increased the
cost of constitutional tort litigation and must be eliminated, since it
authorized a fact-intensive inquiry into the actual state of mind of the
defendant.244 That inquiry made the discovery process especially
burdensome and raised an obstacle to disposition of cases on summary
judgment.245 Justice Brennan’s concurrence did nothing to allay these
concerns, as he found it “inescapable . . . that some measure of
discovery may sometimes be required to determine exactly what a
public official did ‘know’ at the time of his actions.”246 The issue
remained open after Harlow, as Justice Powell did not respond to
Justice Brennan on this point.
Five years later, however, the Court definitively rejected Justice
Brennan’s position in Anderson. The issue in this case was whether an
FBI agent could be held liable for an illegal search, when an officer
could have reasonably believed the search was valid, but plaintiffs
could show that this defendant believed it violated the Fourth
Amendment, as indeed it did. The Court said that Harlow had
“completely reformulated qualified immunity . . . replacing the inquiry
241. 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
242. Id. at 815, 818.
243. Id. at 821 (Brennan, J., concurring).
244. Id. at 816–17 (explaining how fact-intensive inquiries made the discovery
process especially burdensome and raised an obstacle to disposition of cases on
summary judgment).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 821 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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into subjective malice . . . with an objective inquiry into the legal
reasonableness of the official action.”247 The officer’s “subjective
beliefs about the search [were] irrelevant.”248 The Harlow ruling
became a hardline rule that qualified immunity inquiries focus solely
on the state of the law at the time of the constitutional violation, thus
excluding evidence of a defendant’s impermissible motives or reckless
disregard of a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.249 This rule blocks
plaintiffs with valid constitutional claims from recovering from
defendants who do not deserve protection.250
From the perspective of achieving the proper balance between the
costs and benefits of immunity, this holding is doubtful. Justice
Brennan’s alternative seems to accommodate the competing interests
better than the Anderson approach. The pro-liability “vindication of
rights” and “deterrence of violations” policies are at their strongest
when the officer acts in bad faith, that is, without a sincere belief in the
validity of his action.251 In cases where officers act in bad faith, the
defendant has no standing to complain about unfairly imposed
liability, even if the law is sufficiently unclear enough that others acting
in good faith could have believed they were acting properly. The
holding is consistent with Harlow’s concerns about discovery and trial
costs.252 Those concerns are valid, especially since the costs must be
incurred even when the defendant has not acted in bad faith. But
developments since Harlow should be considered in evaluating its
current status. The concerns that gave rise to the deletion of the
subjective prong may not be as great now as they were in 1982. A few
years after Harlow, in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,253 the Court heightened the

247. 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987).
248. Id. at 641.
249. See, e.g., Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546 (2012) (noting that the
test is objective); Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011) (emphasizing that
pretext does not preclude immunity).
250. Archer v. Chisholm, 870 F.3d 603, 615 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[E]ven officers who
knowingly or recklessly submit an affidavit containing falsehoods may receive qualified
immunity if they show an objectively reasonable basis for believing that the affidavit
still demonstrated probable cause.”); Pompeo v. Bd. of Regents, 852 F.3d 973, 982
(10th Cir. 2017) (“[S]ubjective good faith or bad faith of government actors is
ordinarily relevant to the objective inquiry whether a reasonable officer would have
realized that his conduct was unlawful.”).
251. See Jeffries, What’s Wrong, supra note 110, at 868–69 (arguing that egregious
misconduct should not be immunized, even if the law is not “clearly established”).
252. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
253. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
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standard for defeating summary judgment.254 In particular, it held that
a party opposing summary judgment must “make a showing sufficient
to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial,” whether
or not the summary judgment movant has produced an affidavit or
other proof.255 After Celotex, a plaintiff charging bad faith cannot avoid
summary judgment without offering proof at that stage of the case.
Justice Kennedy has suggested that this development has “alleviated” the
problem that had carried so much weight in Harlow.256 Qualified
immunity is a judge-made rule. Acting in the common law tradition, the
Court is fully authorized to modify it in the light of changed conditions.
Experience with Harlow suggests that, even if trial and discovery costs
persist after Celotex, the Court’s rule is not effective at reducing those
costs. As we have seen,257 Schwartz’s empirical study of § 1983 litigation
found that just 3.2% of § 1983 cases were dismissed before trial on
qualified immunity grounds.258 In an earlier study of Bivens cases,
Alexander Reinert reported that qualified immunity led to dismissals
of only two percent of them over a three year period.259 Professor
Schwartz found that “[q]ualified immunity is raised infrequently
before discovery begins.”260 Defendants prevailed on some claims at
summary judgment, but “additional claims or defendants regularly
remained and continued to expose government officials to the
possibility of discovery and trial.”261 Evidently, plaintiffs’ lawyers
responded to Anderson by drafting complaints that cannot be
disposed of on summary judgment under the standards set forth in

254. Id. at 322–23.
255. Id.
256. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 171 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Further
protection is provided by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (holding that
“pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth”). By enabling judges to reject a case deemed to be implausible
on a motion to dismiss the complaint, Iqbal facilitates dismissals of cases in which the
complaint asserts bad faith but provides no specifics. See, e.g., Saldivar v. Racine, 818
F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 2016). Note that the district court may dismiss the case before the
plaintiff has had a chance to engage in discovery.
257. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
258. Schwartz, supra note 35, at 1809.
259. Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its
Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 845 (2010).
260. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, supra note 138, at 9.
261. Id. at 10.
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Celotex.262 In addition, they may sue for prospective relief, or they may
name local governments as defendants.263 Qualified immunity is not a
defense in either context.264
3. Two bites at the apple
In Anderson v. Creighton, the Court held that an officer could
successfully assert qualified immunity for a search that violated the
Fourth Amendment.265 The officer may argue, first, that the search was
reasonable, and second, that he made a reasonable mistake as to the
reasonableness of the search, even if the search was not reasonable. As
Justice Stevens put it in dissent, he is allowed “two bites at the apple.”266
This rule was extended to all Fourth Amendment cases in Saucier v.
Katz.267 The issue in that case was how qualified immunity should be
applied when persons arrested by the police assert that the officers
used excessive force.268 Graham v. Connor269 had held that the general
Fourth Amendment test is whether the officer’s actions were
“objectively reasonable.”270 The qualified immunity test is “whether it
would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in
the situation he confronted.”271 The issue in Saucier was whether the
officer is entitled to argue “reasonableness” twice, or only once.272
Thus, the plaintiff argued that Graham “sets forth an excessive force
analysis indistinguishable from qualified immunity, rendering the
separate immunity inquiry superfluous.”273 But the Court, following
Anderson, ruled that the two inquiries are distinct.274 Across the whole
range of Fourth Amendment issues, the officer may prevail on either
of two distinct grounds: (1) that the force, arrest, or search was
“reasonable,” and therefore not a Fourth Amendment violation, or (2)

262. Id. (explaining how plaintiffs may sue for prospective relief or name local
governments as defendants to survive summary judgment as qualified immunity is not
a defense in these contexts).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).
266. Id. at 664 n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
267. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
268. Id. at 197.
269. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
270. Id. at 388.
271. 533 U.S. at 202.
272. Id. at 199–200.
273. Id. at 204.
274. Id. at 206.
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that the force, arrest, or search was improper, but he made a
reasonable mistake in determining the activity was permissible.275
The Court’s reasoning is unassailable insofar as it reflects the logical
structure of a constitutional tort case.276
Since the substantive
constitutional “reasonableness” issue and the immunity “reasonableness”
issue are in fact distinct, the resolution of the constitutional issue cannot,
by itself, resolve the immunity issue. Under the Fourth Amendment,
unreasonableness of the conduct does not exclude an argument that the
mistake as to the reasonableness of the conduct was itself a reasonable
mistake.277 One criticism of this test is that, logic aside, it is hard for
judges and juries to keep the two questions separate, at least in cases in
which the Fourth Amendment and the immunity issues both seem to
turn on “reasonableness.”278 For present purposes, the more important
objection is that the “cumulation of messages . . . has led many lower
courts to reject civil liability for excessive force in circumstances where
such liability seems fully justified.”279
As a matter of costs and benefits, the case for “two bites at the apple”
is strong in some contexts but weak in others. In Anderson’s case, the
search was objectively reasonable given the information the officer had
to establish probable cause and thus provides a strong example for the
aforementioned approach. It is strong in Anderson’s “probable cause”
fact pattern. The body of Fourth Amendment doctrine bearing on
probable cause to search or to arrest includes a consideration of a
myriad factors, including, for example, the reliability of informants,
the type of crime, and the existence of “exigent circumstances” that
would obviate the need to a warrant, among others.280 The evaluation
of all of these factors by a police officer who does not have a law degree
(or even one who does) may not yield a clear answer in the
275. See id.; see, e.g., Kisela v. Hughes, No. 17-467, slip op. at 3–5 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2018)
(per curiam); Hurt v. Wise, 880 F.3d 831, 841 (7th Cir. 2018); Latits v. Phillips, 878
F.3d 541, 552 (6th Cir. 2017); Wilber v. Curtis, 872 F.3d 15, 20–21 (1st Cir. 2017); Jones
v. Fransen, 857 F.3d 843, 850–52 (11th Cir. 2017). Despite having two chances to win,
some officers do lose these excessive force and false arrest cases. See, e.g., Stephens v.
DeGiovanni, 852 F.3d 1298, 1326–28 (11th Cir. 2017) (excessive force); Graham v.
Gagnon, 831 F.3d 176, 184–86 (4th Cir. 2016) (arrest without probable cause).
276. See Jeffries, Liability Rule, supra note 22, at 265.
277. Id.
278. See 533 U.S. at 210 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) (asserting that
“[t]he two-part test today’s decision imposes holds large potential to confuse”).
279. Jeffries, Liability Rule, supra note 22, at 267–68.
280. See Barbara C. Salken, Balancing Exigency and Privacy in Warrantless Searches to
Prevent Destruction of Evidence: The Need for a Rule, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 283, 286–87 (1988).
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circumstances of a given search.281 If an officer gets it wrong, but
makes a reasonable mistake, it is unfair to second-guess the decision,
and it is likely to lead officers to steer clear of searches that are close to
the constitutional line. Thus, both the fairness and “avoiding
overdeterrence” policies are in play.
But the rationale for a second bite at the apple is weaker in excessive
force cases, in which both the Fourth Amendment issue and the
qualified immunity issue turn on “reasonableness.” If the goal of
immunity is to achieve a “proper balance” between competing policies,
the core problem with Saucier is not the confusion it creates, nor is it
simply the impact it has on outcomes. These are symptoms of a more
basic objection: to a substantial degree, showing sufficient lack of
reasonableness satisfies demonstrating fairness to the officer in
establishing a Fourth Amendment violation.282 In an excessive force
case like Saucier, that showing cannot be made unless the officer has
not only invaded the plaintiff’s interests in bodily integrity and
personal security, but has acted unreasonably in doing so. Fairness to
the officer is largely achieved without proof of a second layer of
unreasonableness, i.e., that the officer not only acted unreasonably in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, but made an unreasonable
mistake in thinking he was allowed to use force. As a matter of avoiding
overdeterrence, the policy argument against official immunity is that
the officer already has the protection he needs in order to use force, in
the form of the Fourth Amendment requirement that the force be
“unreasonable” in order to trigger Fourth Amendment protection.
For these reasons, “qualified immunity would impart only a very slight
addition to the protection built into the constitutional standard for
excessive force.”283

281. See, e.g., Manners v. Cannella, 891 F.3d 959, 968–72 (11th Cir. 2018). Note,
however, that defendants are sometimes found liable despite having had two bites at
the apple. See, e.g., Cozzi v. City of Birmingham, 892 F.3d 1288, 1294 (11th Cir. 2018).
282. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205 (giving officers discretion because they often have
to make rapid decisions).
283. Jeffries, Liability Rule, supra note 22, at 267. Nonetheless, the current qualified
immunity doctrine is especially protective of police officers in Fourth Amendment
cases, because the application of the Fourth Amendment “interest-balancing test” to a
given set of facts will often be uncertain, and the officer will then prevail on the
immunity prong of the case. See, e.g., Sumpter v. Wayne Cty., 868 F.3d 473, 485 (6th
Cir. 2017) (explaining how officers are granted wide latitude when their actions
scrutinized under interest balancing).
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This theme is illustrated by the Supreme Court’s award of immunity
in Kisela v. Hughes.284 In that case, an officer shot at a woman who was
carrying a knife because he believed she was threatening someone
else.285 Suppose the belief was mistaken. If the mistaken belief were
nonetheless reasonable, there would be no Fourth Amendment
violation.286 But suppose the belief was unreasonable, so that the
shooting was a violation of the woman’s Fourth Amendment rights.
The officer still escapes liability if he can show that he reasonably
believed the shooting was justified. In Kisela, the defense may yield a
bit of “avoiding overdeterrence” benefit, and a bit more protection for
officers against imposition of liability without fair warning. If the
provision of an extra shield against liability were costless, the marginal
benefit added by immunity might tip the scale in favor of a defense,
even in “two bites at the apple” excessive force cases. But that marginal
benefit comes at the expense of the pro-liability policies of vindication
of constitutional rights and deterrence of violations. The case against
Saucier is that in this “two bites at the apple” context, the benefits of a
qualified immunity defense are comparatively small, while the costs are
as great as they always are when plaintiffs are denied a victory on the
merits on account of official immunity.
4. Unwarranted reliance on circuit precedent
In Lane v. Franks,287 the substantive issue arose when Edward Lane, a
government employee, was fired for giving truthful testimony pursuant
to a subpoena at a criminal trial.288 That criminal prosecution
concerned a public corruption scandal that Lane discovered at work.
The Eleventh Circuit had dismissed his § 1983 suit on the ground that
Lane’s testimony was not protected speech, and that, even if it were
protected speech, the constitutional rule was unclear at the time Lane
was fired.289 On the First Amendment issue, the Court held

284. No. 17-467, slip op. at 8 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2018) (per curiam).
285. Id. at 6.
286. See, e.g., Horton v. Pobjecky, 883 F.3d 941, 948–51 (7th Cir. 2018) (discussing
how during an armed robbery when one assailant made threats with a gun, it was
reasonable to assume the other three assailants also were armed).
287. 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014).
288. Id. at 2377.
289. Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty. Coll., 523 F. Appx. 709, 711–12, 711 n.2 (11th Cir.
2013) (per curiam).

428

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:379

unanimously that the testimony was protected speech.290 The leading
cases in the area are Pickering v. Board of Education291 and Connick v.
Myers.292 Taken together, these cases held that an employee could not
be fired for speech on a matter of public concern unless the disruptive
impact of the speech outweighed its value.293 As applied to Lane’s case,
the testimony “clearly” met the “speech as a citizen on a matter of
public concern” prong.294 Ever since Pickering, the Court has recognized
that a public employee’s speech concerning his employment holds
special value because of the insight gained regarding public concern
through his profession.295 Moreover, public employee speech is
evidently important in cases such as a public corruption scandal.296
Accordingly, holding that that the speech required to prosecute a public
official for corruption may never be the basis for a retaliation claim
under the First Amendment is “antithetical to our jurisprudence.”297 On
the balance of interests prong, the employer’s interests on the Pickering
scale are completely absent, as the employer neither asserted nor
demonstrated any government interest to the contrary.298
However, this case also presents a qualified immunity issues as Lane
sought damages in a § 1983 suit against the supervisors.299 Despite the
unanimous holding that the testimony was protected by the First
Amendment, the Court held, again unanimously, that the officials
were immune.300 The stumbling block was Garcetti v. Ceballos,301 which
had held that “when public employees make statements pursuant to
their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First

290. See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380–81 (stating that because the government did not
demonstrate any interest that justified treating the employee differently, the
employee’s speech was protected under the First Amendment).
291. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
292. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
293. See id. at 154 (holding that the government interest in wanting to prevent
disruptive office behavior outweighed an employee’s internal policy grievance); see also
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574–75 (finding that absent proof that the statements made were
knowingly false or recklessly made, the statements cannot be the basis for dismissal).
294. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2378.
295. Id. at 2379.
296. Id. at 2380.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 2381.
299. Id. at 2376.
300. See id. at 2383 (holding that Franks had qualified immunity because it was
uncertain whether Lane’s testimony was entitled to First Amendment protection).
301. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
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Amendment purposes.”302 Ceballos, an assistant district attorney had
been denied a promotion and had suffered other adverse actions for
statements he made to other prosecutors and law enforcement
officials, in which he found fault with an affidavit and urged dismissal
of a criminal case.303 This type of “pursuant to official responsibilities”
statement, the Court held, was not covered by the Court’s precedent
in Pickering and Connick.304 After Garcetti, the Eleventh Circuit applied
the holding to situations in which the employee did not speak as part
of the job, but rather about information learned on the job.305 On the
First Amendment merits, the Court in Lane decisively rejected this
reading of Garcetti because “[t]he sworn testimony in this case is far
removed from the . . . internal memorandum [at issue in Garcetti].”306
For that matter, “Garcetti said nothing about speech that simply relates
to public employment.”307 In a concurring opinion joined by Justices
Scalia and Alito, Justice Thomas likewise gave short shrift to the
Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning.308 He noted that Garcetti’s “unprotected
speech” holding applied “when a public employee speaks ‘pursuant to’
his official duties.”309
Despite the Court’s repudiation of the Eleventh Circuit’s precedents,
it held that the defendants were entitled to rely on them.310 The Court
devoted a single sentence to explain why. It said that at the time of the
firing, “no decision of this Court was sufficiently clear to cast doubt on
the controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent.”311 The Court did not
attempt to reconcile this ruling with its earlier observation that “the
Eleventh Circuit read Garcetti far too broadly,”312 or with Justice
Thomas’s view that the substantive issue in Lane “require[d] little more

302. Id. at 421.
303. Id. at 413–15.
304. See id. at 424 (distinguishing expressions made pursuant to one’s official
responsibilities from those made outside the scope of employment).
305. See, e.g., Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, 567 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2009)
(expressing concern that an employer could request information in his official capacity
and then gain protection for whatever statements he makes regarding that information).
306. Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2379 (2014).
307. Id.
308. Id. at 2383–84 (Thomas, J., concurring).
309. Id. at 2383 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–22).
310. See id. at 2282–83 (stating that because Eleventh Circuit precedent was unclear,
the defense of qualified immunity cannot be defeated).
311. Id. at 2381.
312. Id. at 2379.
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than a straightforward application of Garcetti.”313 Instead, the Court
merely recounted the holdings of the Eleventh Circuit cases and
concluded that “[a]t the time of Lane’s termination, Eleventh Circuit
precedent did not provide clear notice that subpoenaed testimony
concerning information acquired through public employment is speech
of a citizen entitled to First Amendment protection.”314
The Court shifted its tone more than once. Having found, initially,
that “the Eleventh Circuit read Garcetti far too broadly,” and then
having found a lack of “clear notice,” the Court next asserted that
“[t]here [was] no doubt that the Eleventh Circuit incorrectly concluded
that Lane’s testimony was not entitled to First Amendment
protection.”315 Despite the lack of doubt, “the question was not ‘beyond
debate’ at the time Franks, the supervisor who fired Lane, acted.”316
The explanation for these equivocations is that the Court gives
weight to circuit precedent in applying the “clearly established law”
principle,317 and does so even in the face of Supreme Court rulings to
the contrary. Consequently, even if a circuit rule is “no doubt”
mistaken, it will protect the officer from liability for damages. Officers
are certainly entitled to look to the law of the circuit on matters the
Supreme Court has not addressed. But the Court gives too much
deference to the circuits in cases like Lane. The Supreme Court’s
balancing test set forth by Pickering and Connick has roots in the
fundamental First Amendment principle that speech bearing on selfgovernment receives a high level of protection.318 The application of
that principle will occasionally present hard questions, but Lane’s case
was not one of them. Few, if any, competent lawyers could have
doubted that the First Amendment protected Lane’s truthful,
subpoenaed trial testimony on public corruption. Despite the
Eleventh Circuit precedent that read Garcetti broadly, that point was
sufficiently clear to provide the notice necessary to satisfy the qualified
immunity policies. Garcetti’s distinction between speech “pursuant to”

313. Id. at 2383 (Thomas, J., concurring).
314. Id. at 2382–83.
315. Id. at 2383.
316. Id.
317. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614–15, 617 (1999) (diminishing petitioner’s
claim because petitioner did not provide any controlling cases to support the rule on
which petitioner relies).
318. See, e.g., Stough v. Gallagher, 967 F.2d 1523, 1529 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that
encouraging people to vote for a candidate is a critical part of self-government and is
greatly valued under the First Amendment).
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official duties and other speech by government employees may not be
sufficiently clear to mark the protected/unprotected border for every
instance of government employee speech. But it is clear from Garcetti’s
“pursuant to official duties” rationale that testimony compelled under
subpoena in a criminal case is not covered by Garcetti’s holding.
Lane may belong to a category of cases in which reliance on circuit
court precedent is unreasonable.319 The Court should recognize an
exception to Harlow for cases that fall into this category, if only to
discourage reliance on Lane in situations in which Supreme Court
precedent clearly establishes unconstitutionality but defendants can
cite dubious lower court decisions.320 Under the categorical approach,
reliance on circuit court precedent would be unavailing in such a case
no matter how strongly the circuit court cases support the defense. To
put the rationale for this rule in cost-benefit terms: there is no
occasion to accommodate the competing constitutional tort policies321
because there is no uncertainty at all as to the place of the Supreme
Court at the top of the hierarchy of courts. Thus, the fairness concern
is weak when the Supreme Court doctrine is sufficiently clear to
provide “fair warning”322 even if circuit precedent is to the contrary.
For the same reason, a clear Supreme Court ruling eliminates the gray
area that sometimes produces overly cautious government action, and
it does so even if circuit court precedent seems to allow the officer to go
further. In this type of case, the plaintiff-friendly policies of vindication
of rights and deterrence of violations should control the outcome.
5. Distinctions without differences
In many constitutional tort cases, the “clearly established law” issue
is more accurately described as “clearly established application of law

319. See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2381 (noting that the circuit court precedent did not make
unreasonable the belief that one could fire an employee based on his or her testimony).
320. The converse situation, in which circuit court precedent states a clear rule
which the defendant violates, but Supreme Court cases cast doubt on the lower court
precedent, does not raise any exception to Harlow issues. See, e.g., Kisela v. Hughes,
No. 17-467, slip op. at 6 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2018) (per curiam) (noting that the lower court
made errors in its conclusion based on its own precedent). The defendant simply argues
that under Harlow the circuit court precedent does not clearly establish the
unconstitutionality of his act, and that this is so even if the circuit court precedent is correct.
321. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (weighing the social costs
against the effect on public officials).
322. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739–40 (2002) (explaining that a defendant
was entitled to a fair warning that his conduct was depriving a victim of one of the
victim’s constitutional rights).
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to fact,” because “the right cannot be defined at a high level of
generality; instead, the key is whether the specific conduct has been
clearly established as a constitutional violation.”323 For example, the
Fourth Amendment authorizes police officers to use “reasonable”
force to subdue suspects.324 In “excessive force” cases, the issue is
whether the officer has gone too far.325 Since the reasonableness of
the use of force depends on the circumstances of each particular
encounter, and since the law developed in connection with one
circumstance may not clearly establish the law for another
circumstance, officers often have grounds for an assertion of qualified
immunity.326 The strength of those grounds will vary from one case to
the next because some factual variations have legal significance while
others do not. The Supreme Court’s formulation of the qualified
immunity rule invites courts to tilt the analysis in favor of immunity in
close cases. It requires that “every reasonable official would have
understood that what he is doing violates [the] right,”327 and that “existing
precedent must have placed the . . . question beyond debate.”328
Some courts award qualified immunity even when the legal or
factual distinction is slight. For example, in A.M. v. Holmes,329 a
thirteen-year-old seventh grader disrupted class by burping, laughing,
and refusing to stop when told to do so.330 His classmates were
entertained but the teacher was not.331 She called the school resource
officer—a police officer assigned to the school—who arrested the boy,
put him in handcuffs, and took him to a juvenile detention facility.332
The boy and his parents sued under § 1983 for a Fourth Amendment
violation but a divided Tenth Circuit panel granted the officer

323. Lincoln v. Maketa, 880 F.3d 533, 537 (10th Cir. 2018) (citing Mullenix v. Luna,
136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam)).
324. See, e.g., Wardlaw v. Pickett, 1 F.3d 1297, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
325. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989) (stating that a
determination of the reasonableness of force must include analysis of the
circumstances surrounding the use of force).
326. See Wells, supra note 223, at 95–98 (explaining the difficulties in discerning a
standard due to different precedential signals stemming from unique circumstances).
327. Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563
U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).
328. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741.
329. 830 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 2016).
330. Id. at 1129.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 1130.
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qualified immunity.333 Though earlier cases had held that an arrest
would be improper in similar circumstances, the majority
distinguished those cases, as they involved a different criminal
statute.334 In his dissent, then-Judge Gorsuch pointed out that “the
relevant language of the two statutes is identical.”335 Similarly in Coffin
v. Brandau,336 a police officer came to the plaintiff’s house with a
summons but without an arrest or search warrant.337 The law was clear
that he could not enter the front door without a warrant or consent.338
However, he entered the door of the attached garage instead.339 The
Eleventh Circuit held that the entry violated the Fourth Amendment
but granted qualified immunity anyway, on the ground that under
Fourth Amendment principles a reasonable person might distinguish
a garage door from a front door.340 Lastly in Gilmore v. Hodges,341 a
hearing-impaired prisoner sued for failure to provide him with
Although Eighth Amendment
batteries for his hearing aids.342
precedents clearly established that denial of dentures, eye glasses, and
prostheses amounted to cruel and unusual punishment, the Eleventh
Circuit found no clearly established rule against denial of hearing aids.343
While pro-immunity values are comparatively weak across cases that
differ from earlier plaintiff-friendly rulings, the constitutional norms
remain the same and therefore do not support a finding of surprise.344
333. See id. at 1129, 1151 (reasoning that the law at the time of the incident would
not have put a reasonable police officer on notice that his actions constituted a Fourth
Amendment violation).
334. See id. at 1143–45 (distinguishing the present criminal statute because the
statute the student relied on did not include provisions regarding interfering with the
educational process).
335. Id. at 1170 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
336. 642 F.3d 999 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
337. Id. at 1004.
338. See id. at 1009 (stating that the Fourth Amendment’s protections are at the
highest in the home).
339. Id. at 1005.
340. See id. at 1017–18 (discussing the officers’ reasonable conclusion that they
could enter the garage to make the arrest based on the circumstances).
341. 738 F.3d 266 (11th Cir. 2013).
342. Id. at 268–69.
343. Id. at 274–75.
344. See, e.g., Simon v. City of New York, 893 F.3d 83, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2018) (rejecting
qualified immunity because “the factual distinction advanced here—that the
defendants acted on a material witness warrant, not a criminal arrest warrant—is
irrelevant. Any warrant must be executed in reasonable conformity with its terms—a
rule so integral to Fourth Amendment doctrine that we are untroubled that no case
has previously applied it to a material witness warrant”).
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The Supreme Court could recognize this systematic imbalance by
adopting a rule that immunity should not be awarded when there is a
factual distinction but the distinction does not reflect a legally
significant difference.345 In Hope v. Pelzer, it seemed to do just that. An
earlier binding case had held that chaining a prisoner to a fence for a
long period of time as punishment would violate the Eighth
Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment.346 In Hope,
prison guards had chained the prisoner to a hitching post, and the
Eleventh Circuit applied qualified immunity on the theory that
precedent cases did not clearly establish an Eighth Amendment
violation for chaining a prisoner to a hitching post.347 The Supreme
Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s “rigid overreliance on factual
similarity”348 and held that the key issue is “fair warning.”349 But the
Court soon turned away from the plaintiff-friendly approach it had
taken in Hope. Its “subsequent decisions veered back toward requiring
precedential specificity.”350

345. For example, it might have applied this principle in Kisela v. Hughes, No. 17467, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2018) (per curiam). An earlier case had held that a
police officer may not use deadly force against a person who acts erratically and
disobeys officers’ commands, but who is not threatening anyone. In Kisela, the most
important new wrinkle is that the plaintiff was carrying a kitchen knife. The majority
held that this factual difference justified qualified immunity. Id. at 7. Justice
Sotomayor, in dissent, argued that this was a distinction without a difference. See id. at
9–11 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (analogizing this case to precedent); see also
Thompson v. Rahr, 885 F.3d 582, 585, 587 (9th Cir. 2018). In this case, the majority
awarded qualified immunity to an officer who, according to the plaintiff’s account,
pointed a gun at the plaintiff in the course of a traffic stop and threatened to kill him.
Earlier cases had held that similar conduct would violate the Fourth Amendment, and
the majority agreed that the officer committed a Fourth Amendment violation. In his
dissent, Judge Christen argued that the officer had “fair notice,” id. at 595, despite the
“minor factual differences” between the two cases. Id. at 594.
346. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 742 (2002) (citing Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d
1291, 1306 (5th Cir. 1974)).
347. Id. at 733.
348. Id. at 742.
349. Id. at 739–41.
350. Jeffries, Liability Rule, supra note 22, at 257; see, e.g., Brosseau v. Haugen, 543
U.S. 194, 194, 197–98, 201 (2004) (per curiam). In Brosseau, the Court awarded
qualified immunity to an officer who had used deadly force against a man who evaded
the officer and drove away. Id. at 597–98, 600. The main Supreme Court precedent,
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), required that the officer reasonably believed
his target posed a danger to the officer or others. Id. at 3. The Court seemed to hold
that Garner was not sufficient to provide the necessary warning.
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“Fair warning” is too vague a concept to guide and constrain decision
making. Its content depends on a decision maker’s conception of
fairness, which can depend on a wide array of contextual factors.
“Distinctions without differences” is more rule-like, because it directs
courts to deny qualified immunity unless they are persuaded that a
later case differs in a legally significant way from the earlier one. The
retreat from Hope might have been resisted more effectively if the
Court had articulated a “distinctions without difference” rule instead
of putting all of its weight on the norm of “fair notice.” As Frederick
Schauer has pointed out, “rule-bound decisionmaking is inherently . . .
conservative, in the nonpolitical sense of the word.”351 Judges inclined
to stray would have at least been obliged to advance arguments as to
why the rule should not apply to the case at hand.
This is a weaker constraint than the first four, because it does not
identify a circumstance that would resolve the immunity issue by itself.
It may not compel different outcomes in cases like Kisela, A.M., Coffin,
and Gilmore, but it would at least furnish the plaintiff’s lawyer a means
for drawing the court’s attention to the relevant question. Kisela, A.M.,
Coffin, and Gilmore are cases in which the prior law lays down a clear
constitutional line, which provides both fair warning and the guidance
needed to allay undue caution. In cases of this type, courts may have
to decide, based on the facts of that particular case, whether a given
distinction actually reflects a difference. But the articulation of a
category still has value, because it provides crucial guidance to the
adjudicator.352 It focuses the argument on the legally significant
feature of the situation. For example, in a case like Coffin, the officer
may argue that a garage door is not really like a front door, because
the garage is not central to the dwelling. The plaintiff’s answer to this
line of reasoning is that the settled law on front doors gives the fair
warning to which the officer is entitled, as there is no legally significant
difference, for Fourth Amendment purposes, between front doors and
attached garage doors. The rule would direct the court to concentrate
on that issue, and to refrain from speculation of the kind invited by
Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd353 and Reichle v. Howards354 as to whether “every”
officer would have understood that the entry violated the Fourth
Amendment, or whether the issue is “beyond debate.”
The

351.
352.
353.
354.

See Schauer, supra note 21, at 542.
See SCHAUER, supra note 75, at 113 (discussing the guidance function of rules).
563 U.S. 731 (2011).
566 U.S. 658 (2012).
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“distinctions without differences” rule would remind the court that the
immunity issue is not whether a distinction can be drawn but whether
the distinction is warranted by the fair warning goal of official
immunity. The mere availability of a front door/garage door
distinction does not cast doubt on the conclusion that the officer had
sufficient notice to satisfy the fairness and social costs goals served by
qualified immunity.
6. Ineluctable inferences
Closely related to “distinctions without differences” is the situation
in which well-settled general principles support liability. But there is
no prior case with similar facts, and thus no occasion for the court to
draw a distinction, even one that does not reflect a legally significant
difference. Many courts tend to grant qualified immunity in this type
of case.355 For example, in Robles v. Prince George’s County,356 the Fourth
Circuit granted immunity to police officers who left an arrestee tied to
a pole in a parking lot in the middle of the night when they could not
find a place to take him.357 The court acknowledged that earlier cases
involving unjustified physical restraints on pretrial detainees put the
officers on notice that “they were acting inappropriately.”358
Unfortunately for Robles, none of them involved tying someone to a
pole.359 Thus, for the Fourth Circuit, the officers’ Fourth Amendment
violation was not “clearly established.”360 Professor Jeffries cites this
case as an illustration of the current misalignment between the
immunity policies and the application of Harlow.361 The specific
problem it illustrates is that, “[i]n searching for clearly established law,

355. See, e.g., Knopf v. Williams, 884 F.3d 939, 949 (10th Cir. 2018) (per curiam)
(quoting White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017)) (stating the proposition that
rejection of immunity depends on “identify[ing] a case where an [official was] acting
under similar circumstances”).
356. 302 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2002).
357. Id. at 271.
358. Id.
359. See generally Putman v. Gerloff, 639 F.2d 415, 418 (8th Cir. 1981) (involving
plaintiffs who were handcuffed together and left in a sitting position for twelve hours);
see also Jefferson v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 303, 304 (5th Cir. 1987) (involving
a plaintiff who was tied to a chair for an entire school day); Fisher v. Wash. Metro.
Transit Auth., 690 F.2d 1133, 1136 (4th Cir. 1982) (concerning a plaintiff who was
detained naked in view of members of the opposite sex).
360. Robles, 302 F.3d at 271.
361. See Jeffries, Liability Rule, supra note 22, at 255.
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courts seek precedents similar on the facts.”362 They do this despite the
Supreme Court’s admonition in Hope that “officials can still be on notice
that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual
circumstances.”363
An advantage of a categorical approach is that the articulation of a
rule to that effect would elevate the status of inference-drawing.
Assuming Robles is the typical case, the question of whether there is fair
warning is often ignored in practice, but nonetheless appears to be the
question lower courts ought to ask.364 The creation of a special
category would heighten its salience. As with “distinctions without
differences” it would channel the debate over immunity more
effectively than the current broad rule. The plaintiff’s lawyer would be
enabled to call the court’s attention to the “ineluctable inferences”
rule and the officer would lose unless he has a convincing rebuttal.
Consider Mirabella v. Villard365 as an illustration of how this rule may
influence qualified immunity litigation. Maureen and John Mirabella
had quarreled with a neighbor over the neighbor’s use of property that
belonged to Montgomery Township.366 After complaining to the local
authorities without success, the Mirabellas sent the Board of
Supervisors an email, informing them that they would sue the
neighbor and would name the Township as an indispensable party.367
Joseph Walsh, Chairperson of the Board of Supervisors, responded
with an email in which he told the Mirabellas to have no further
contact with him or other Township employees, on any topic or for any
reason.368 The Mirabellas then sued Walsh and other officials under
§ 1983.369 They alleged, among other things, that Walsh’s email
amounted to retaliation for the exercise of their First Amendment
rights.370 The defendants did “not dispute that the Mirabellas . . .
engaged in constitutionally protected speech . . . when they protested
362. Id. at 253 (emphasis added).
363. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002); see also Stephens v. DeGiovanni,
852 F.3d 1298, 1316, 1327 (11th Cir. 2017) (following Hope on “obvious clarity”).
364. See Jeffries, Liability Rule, supra note 22, at 253 (suggesting that “[t]he distortion
that now attends qualified immunity can be seen in many lower court decisions”).
365. 853 F.3d 641 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Edrei v. Maguire, 892 F.3d 525, 542 (2d
Cir. 2018) (stating that “novel technology, without more, does not entitle an officer to
qualified immunity”).
366. Mirabella, 853 F.3d at 646–47.
367. Id. at 647.
368. Id.
369. See id. at 648.
370. Id.
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the Township’s failure to protect the open space and threatened
litigation.”371 Nor was there any dispute over the settled rule that
retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right is a constitutional
violation.372 Furthermore, the “no contact” email, which “barred the
Mirabellas from communicating directly with their local government,
for any reason, . . . was retaliatory.”373
Nonetheless, the Mirabellas lost on qualified immunity grounds.374
The court could not find any cases that clearly established the “right to
be free from a retaliatory restriction on communication with one’s
government, when the plaintiff has threatened or engaged in litigation
against the government.”375 Under the “ineluctable inference” rule,
the inquiry would focus on fair warning. Failure to find a case on point
would not be fatal to the plaintiff’s case.376 In light of the clearly
established right against retaliation for the exercise of the clearly
established free speech right, the issue would be whether those
principles gave Walsh fair warning that his email was retaliatory. Walsh
may still have a good defense, but he will not have a good defense just
because the Mirabellas cannot cite a prior case.

371. Id. at 649.
372. Id. (“Official reprisal for protected speech ‘offends the Constitution [because]
it threatens to inhibit exercise of the protected right.’” (quoting Hartman v. Moore,
547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006))).
373. Id. at 650.
374. See id. at 657 (holding that although the Mirabellas alleged a violation of their
First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances, the right
was not clearly established under the qualified immunity analysis).
375. Id. at 653.
376. See, e.g., Sims v. Labowitz, 885 F.3d 254, 264 (4th Cir. 2018). Sims, a seventeenyear-old, was accused of child pornography for sending a photograph of his erect penis
to his fifteen-year-old girlfriend. Id. at 259. An officer obtained a search warrant that
would authorize an order that Sims masturbate in front of officers so that they could
obtain a photograph of his erect penis. Id. Sims sued for a Fourth Amendment
violation. Id. at 260. Despite the lack of a case on point, the court rejected qualified
immunity: “Because there was no justification for the alleged search to photograph
Sims’ erect penis and the order that he masturbate in the presence of others, we
conclude that well-established Fourth Amendment limitations on sexually invasive
searches adequately would have placed any reasonable officer on notice that such
police action was unlawful . . . . We further observe that the [defendant] is not entitled
to invoke qualified immunity simply because no other court decisions directly have
addressed circumstances like those presented here.” Id. at 264.
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B. Two Strong Immunity Categories
The logic of the cost-benefit model implies that it may, in some
circumstances, favor broader, rather than narrower, official immunity.
In the two contexts discussed in this section, the pro-defendant
“avoiding overdeterrence” and “fairness to defendants” interests are
especially strong, and thus may justify absolute immunity for officials,
rather than Harlow’s qualified immunity. The two contexts discussed
here involve cases in which: (1) high officials are sued for actions
related to national security; and (2) cases in which the plaintiff obtains
prospective relief. As with the six “anti-immunity” categories, my aim
is to show that there are grounds for distinctive treatment of these fact
patterns. Whether those grounds are strong enough is a separate
question, and one for the Supreme Court to resolve. In any event, the
Court, with the aid of history, has already identified some categories in
which the cost-benefit calculation supports an absolute immunity,
namely those in which the actor exercises a prosecutorial, judicial, or
legislative function,377 as well as official actions taken by the President
of the United States.378 Thus, the issue explored in this Section is
whether the national security and prospective relief contexts are
sufficiently analogous to these previously established categories to
warrant similar treatment.
1. Absolute immunity for “executive officers” in national security cases
In Harlow, the Court left open the possibility that it would make an
exception to its blanket qualified immunity rule for executive officers,
including Presidential aides.379 It said that “[f]or aides entrusted with
discretionary authority in such sensitive areas as national security or
foreign policy, absolute immunity might well be justified to protect the
unhesitating performance of functions vital to the national interest.”380
Since Harlow, that question has remained open in the development of
qualified immunity doctrine. In Ziglar, the Court returned to this
377. See Fallon, supra note 23, at 492 (explaining that the Supreme Court “has held
that officials sued for performing judicial, legislative, and prosecutorial functions
possess absolute immunity from damages liability” while “[o]fficials performing nearly
all other functions receive qualified immunity”).
378. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 756 (1982) (establishing that “[i]n view
of the special nature of the President’s constitutional office and functions,” there must
be absolute Presidential immunity “from damages liability for acts within the ‘outer
perimeter’ of his official responsibility”).
379. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982).
380. Id. at 812.
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theme, but it did so in a somewhat different context. It took the step
of giving three of the defendants a special label, calling them
“Executive Officials.”381 These included former Attorney General John
Ashcroft, former FBI Director Robert Mueller, and former
Immigration and Naturalization Service Commissioner James Ziglar.382
In explaining its rejection of a Bivens suit, the Court emphasized its
role in high-level policy making. The special costs of authorizing a
damages cause of action in this context included “inquiry and
discovery into the whole course of the discussions and deliberations
that led to the policies and governmental acts being challenged.”383
Courts would be required “to interfere in an intrusive way with sensitive
functions of the Executive Branch.”384 In this particular case, Abbasi’s
complaint related to “sensitive issues of national security,” which are
“the prerogative of Congress and the President.”385 When Justice
Kennedy turned to the qualified immunity issue raised by the
§ 1985(3) claim, he referenced this earlier “Executive Officials”
discussion and added that “open discussion among federal officers is
to be encouraged, so that they can reach consensus on the policies a
department of the Federal Government should pursue.”386 If private
suits for damages were allowed in this context, “the result would be to
chill the interchange and discourse that is necessary for the adoption
and implementation of governmental policies.”387 As the Court
cautioned, “[t]he risk of personal damages liability is more likely to
cause an official to second-guess difficult but necessary decisions
concerning national security policy.”388
In its opinion, the Court raised this concern to support the denial of
a Bivens cause of action on most of the claims, as well as the award of
qualified immunity on the § 1985(3) claim.389 The logic of this
rationale may not be so limited. The Court’s reasoning, with its
emphasis on the distinctive disadvantages of allowing suits against high
level “Executive Officials” in national security cases, may have

381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.

Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1853 (2017).
Id.
Id. at 1860.
Id. at 1861.
Id.
Id. at 1868.
Id.
Id. at 1861.
Id. at 1868–69.
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implications beyond the Bivens and § 1985(3) contexts.390 Instead of
qualified immunity, the cost-benefit calculus underlying official
immunity doctrine may justify absolute immunity, at least for some acts
by Executive Officials. Both as a matter of fairness and effective
government, the costs of liability may be especially great in this context.
The Court’s reasoning on the § 1985(3) claim seems to treat the
“Executive Officials” theme as a freestanding ground for immunity,
separate from the “lack of clarity on intrabranch conspiracies” prong
of the analysis. The “Executive Officials” prong makes no reference to
lack of clarity in the law, and thus suggests that this concern exists even
if the legal doctrine is clearly established. In that event, the general
Harlow rule would be unhelpful in protecting high officers from
personal liability, yet the pro-immunity case for “Executive Officials
and national security” would still be strong. The Court does not call it
an absolute immunity, but as a functional matter it seems to be
accurately characterized as one. In the Court’s absolute immunity
doctrine, the key issue is not whether the law is clearly established, but
whether the officer’s function is one that needs special protection.
Ziglar’s rationale for the immunity of executive officers in national
security decision-making may be best understood as a ruling that highlevel executive policy making is one of those functions.
The need to shield federal “Executive Officials” from liability for
damages for some aspects of high level policy making may well apply
to actions by state officials as well. The Court’s anti-Bivens holding does
not address that concern, as that holding has no force in suits against
state officers. Since those officers can be sued pursuant to a statutory
cause of action under § 1983, the whole Bivens doctrine is irrelevant in
such actions. If the “high level national security policy making”
objection to liability is valid in the context of suits against federal
officials, it should be presumptively available in suits against state
officials as well, provided they can show that the activity in question is
sufficiently similar to national security decision making. As the Court
pointed out in another context, “[t]he pressures and uncertainties
facing decisionmakers in state government are little if at all different
from those affecting federal officials.”391 Immunity doctrine, not Bivens
doctrine, is the means by which that principle can be implemented.

390. Id. at 1866, 1868.
391. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 500 (1978). The issue in Butz was whether
federal officials were entitled to absolute immunity for actions similar to those for
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Should the Court recognize this absolute immunity rule, a question
would arise as to its scope: would it apply only to national security
decisions and similar decisions by high ranking state officers, or would
it cover all high-level decisions? The Court’s language in Ziglar,
encouraging wide-reaching immunity for high ranking government
officials dealing with sensitive issues of national security, suggests a
broader meaning. But two Supreme Court cases hold otherwise. In
Scheuer v. Rhodes, the Court rejected absolute immunity for a state
governor for decisions made in connection with deploying the
National Guard to suppress campus unrest.392 Citing Scheuer, the Court
rejected absolute immunity for the Secretary of Agriculture in Butz v.
Economou.393 The Court explained that absolute immunity “would
seriously erode the protection provided by basic constitutional
guarantees.”394 The cost of immunity is especially great when the official
holds a high rank because “the greater power of such officials affords a
greater potential for a regime of lawless conduct.”395 Butz and Scheuer
are solid precedents that courts would need to be overcome if they do
not want to confine the hypothesized absolute immunity to the national
security context. In my view, Butz and Scheuer were rightly decided.
Thus, the immunity doctrine suggested by Ziglar’s reasoning should be
confined to an absolute immunity for national security matters and not
allowed to spill over into other forms of high-level decision making.
2. Vindication and deterrence by prospective relief
In some constitutional tort suits the vindication and deterrence
benefits of liability are comparatively small, because those goals can be
obtained, at least to some extent, without an award of damages. In this
set of fact patterns, the Lyons rule will not preclude prospective relief,396
because the violation is continuing or a recurrence is sufficiently
likely.397 The plaintiff who succeeds on the merits obtains an especially
powerful remedy—an injunction or a declaratory judgment that
should put a stop to the illegality, rather than merely putting a price

which state officials only received qualified immunity. Id. The Court ruled that they
were not. Id.
392. 416 U.S. 232, 247–49 (1974).
393. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
394. Id. at 505.
395. Id. at 506.
396. See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text.
397. Id.
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on it.398 That ruling will not only affirm the plaintiff’s rights but also
deter future constitutional violations. “Defendants will likely be better
deterred from continuing to commit constitutional violations through
the use of injunctions or declaratory judgments, as opposed to the
damages remedy, because such judgments can be enforced without
bringing entirely new lawsuits. An example of this is through contempt
judgments against officials who do not comply.399
Vindication of rights is compromised when damages are denied, as
they are when immunity is successfully asserted. But the Court’s rules
on damages do not favor large awards in any event. Those rules follow
the common law model. Under them, plaintiffs must prove damages,
and the Court has explicitly rejected jury instructions that would
authorize recovery for the value of the constitutional right.400 Since
denials of constitutional rights often produce few tangible losses, few
plaintiffs are able to obtain very large awards.401 Even a small or
nominal award serves the vindication goal when no other relief is

398. See Bell v. Hood, 66 S. Ct. 773, 777 (1946) (“[W]here federally protected rights have
been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their
remedies so as to grant the necessary relief. And it is also well settled that where legal rights
have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion,
federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.”).
399. See, e.g., Melendres v. Arpaio, No. CV-07-2513-PHX-GMS, 2016 WL 3916704, at
*1, *6–7 (D. Ariz. July 20, 2016) (finding that the district court did not violate the Tenth
Amendment when it imposed three civil contempt charges against Sheriff Joseph Arpaio
and the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office for various constitutional violations against the
plaintiffs (inmates in the Maricopa County Jail), because the court had “previously
fashioned less intrusive remedies, but those remedies were not effective due to
[d]efendants’ deliberate failures [to adhere to the court orders] and manipulations”).
400. See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986) (rejecting
jury instructions that asked the jury to compensate for the deprivation of constitutional
rights on the basis that it would require the jury to base its decision on a “subjective
perception of the importance of constitutional rights as an abstract matter”); see also
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263–64, 264 n.20 (1978) (holding that although distress
caused by the denial of a constitutional right is compensable under § 1983,
compensatory damages cannot be awarded without “proof that such injury actually was
caused,” and the jury must be properly instructed as such).
401. Large awards are available in some cases, for example, when a plaintiff is
severely beaten by police officers, or jailors, or other inmates. But incidents of this
type rarely involve requests for prospective relief, as they are not ongoing or
threatened violations, and hence do not fall within the rule I propose. That said, I
cannot exclude the existence of cases in which a litigant has suffered significant
damages by illegal conduct that could give rise to prospective relief. Under the rule I
propose, that litigant may choose to pursue only damages, omit any request for
prospective relief, and leave that litigation strategy to others.
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available.402 The situation is different when the plaintiff obtains
prospective relief. In practice if not in theory, the vindication costs of
disallowing recovery of damages are comparatively small in such cases.403
Put in terms of the cost-benefit model of qualified immunity, plaintiffs
achieve significant vindication and deterrence when they obtain
prospective relief. The benefits of supplementing that relief with a
damages award are comparatively small. Conversely, the cost of
immunity is comparatively small. At the same time, the benefits of
immunity may be especially strong in prospective relief cases. In an
influential article, Professor Jeffries described one systemically
important benefit: the shield against liability for damages “facilitates
constitutional change by reducing the costs of innovation.”404 Immunity
implies that the long run benefits of constitutional evolution are
purchased at the cost of denial of damages to those who have been
injured under the old regime, now understood to have violated their
constitutional rights.405 Thus, the overall level of constitutional
protection may be higher rather than lower in a regime of official
immunity than without immunity.406 Courts can undertake law reform
without worrying that officers will be liable in damages for conduct that
is now deemed unconstitutional.407 The larger point here is that all of
constitutional tort law is of distinctly secondary importance from the
perspective of constitutional innovation. Prospective relief, such as
injunctions and declaratory judgments, as opposed to damage awards,
are the main weapons for achieving constitutional change, because
such relief is often broader in its scope, available to a wider range of
plaintiffs, and subject to continuing oversight by judges.408
402. See Michael L. Wells, Constitutional Remedies: Reconciling Official Immunity with the
Vindication of Rights, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 713, 726–28 (2014) (“Despite the fact-intensive
legal issues [constitutional tort] cases usually present, and the ensuing risk of losing on
account of official immunity, plaintiffs persist in bringing them. It appears that the desire
to have one’s day in court against officers and governments is strong enough to overcome
the obstacles to recovery and the meager monetary rewards of victory.”).
403. Id. at 728 n.85 (citing Scott Hershovitz, Harry Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory,
63 STAN. L. REV. 67, 71–74 (2010)) (discussing the value of tort litigation aimed primarily
at vindication of rights, or “insulted honor,” as opposed to monetary rewards, as it
empowers people to hold governments accountable, especially in cases of intentional
torts where government actors believe they can harm without consequence).
404. Jeffries, Right-Remedy Gap, supra note 156, at 90.
405. Id. at 98–100, 105–10.
406. See Fallon, supra note 23, at 484, 488.
407. See Jeffries, Right-Remedy Gap, supra note 156, at 99–100, 113.
408. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1292–95 (1976).
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For these reasons, the cost of immunity may be especially low and
the benefits of immunity may be especially high in litigation in which
plaintiffs seek both prospective relief and damages. Professor Jeffries
advanced his rationale for the “right-remedy gap” in support of the
current qualified immunity rule.409 But the logic of his argument is not
so limited. The rationale for an absolute immunity from damages in
such cases is that the cost-benefit comparison is sufficiently proimmunity to support one.410 The benefits of allowing plaintiffs to win
damages as well as prospective relief are too small to justify the
availability of backward-looking relief, even for plaintiffs who can prove
that the officers they sue have violated clearly established law.411
Adoption of such a rule would not necessarily mean that plaintiffs
who obtain injunctive relief automatically forfeit damages claims.
Some or all of the anti-immunity rules discussed in Section III.A, above,
may override it. In particular, the “bad faith” rule may supersede the
prospective relief rule, so that damages would still be available to the
plaintiff who can show not only a violation of clearly established law
but also malice or recklessness or intent to violate constitutional rights.
Consider, for example, a sheriff who abuses the Latino population
after being told by a federal judge that his actions violate the
Constitution and that he must stop.412 The availability of prospective
relief against the sheriff should not stand in the way of a recovery of
damages as well.
CONCLUSION
Discussions of qualified immunity have become unnecessarily
polarized.413 According to the Supreme Court, qualified immunity is
available unless “every” similarly situated officer would have known the
act was unconstitutional.414 It protects “all but the plainly incompetent
409. Jeffries, Right-Remedy Gap, supra note 156, at 90–91 (emphasis added) (arguing
that “the requirement of fault facilitates constitutional innovation and favors the
future,” but adding that Jeffries’ support of the doctrine does not mean that he
“endorse[s] the precise contours of existing law” in that the Supreme Court presently
requires “too much fault as a condition of constitutional tort liability”).
410. Id. at 105.
411. Id. at 98–99, 104–05.
412. See supra note 398 and accompanying text.
413. Alan K. Chen, The Intractability of Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1937,
1943 (2018) (discussing the discourse over qualified immunity as between those who
advocate for “hard rules,” which offer more predictability and limit discretion, and
“softer standards,” which theoretically should provide more fairness and flexibility).
414. Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).
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and those who knowingly violate the law,” or it applies unless the
constitutional issue is “beyond debate.”415 In its current form, the
doctrine protects far more official misconduct than its underlying aims
would support. Critics of qualified immunity are equally adamant.
They demand that the defense be eliminated or that local governments
be held strictly liable for constitutional violations by their employees.416
In a recent article, Professor Alan Chen argues that “there is little hope
for resolution of the doctrine’s central dilemmas short of either
abandoning immunity or making it absolute.”417
This article may not resolve the doctrine’s central dilemmas, but it
does propose an alternative to both the status quo and the strict
liability approach. The chief problem with immunity is not that the
policies underlying it are unworthy. Even if the social costs grounds
on which the Court relies are empirically dubious, the value of fairness
to defendants supports a principle that officers and governments
should not be held liable without fault. There may be other grounds
for recognition of an official immunity defense, which are as yet
unarticulated or only vaguely understood. The stronger objection to
current qualified immunity law is that the Court has formulated the
doctrine as a general rule, which cannot be convincingly justified
either by the immunity policies or by the benefits of stating law in the
form of rules. Perhaps a better approach would be the implementation
of targeted rules that eliminate qualified immunity in the cases in which
the costs of immunity do not outweigh the benefits, instead of retaining
the current doctrine or shifting to strict liability entirely. These targeted
rules should also include those aimed at granting executive officials an
absolute immunity in cases in which the benefits of a bar to liability
outweigh the costs.

415. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986); Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741.
416. See Chen, supra note 413, at 1961–62 (detailing a study that found that the
scope of police officer indemnification is “nearly universal,” and in a broader sense
often times cases are dismissed in qualified immunity grounds, even when qualified
immunity could be raised).
417. Id. at 1938 (“Among these problems are continuing disputes over the degree
to which discovery is permissible prior to resolving immunity claims, the coherent
implementation of supposedly transsubstantive summary judgment procedures, and
the continuing consumption of substantial resources by the adjudication of qualified
immunity claims.”).

